Abstract
In a sex selective abortion, a woman aborts a fetus simply on account of the fetus’ sex. Her motivation or underlying reason for doing so may very well be sexist. She could be disposed to thinking that a female child is inferior to a male one. In a hate crime, an individual commits a crime on account of a victim’s sex, race, sexual orientation or the like. The individual may be sexist or racist in picking his victim. He or she could be disposed to thinking that one race or sex is inferior to another. I argue that while a prohibition on sex selective abortions is anomalous in a liberal, criminal legal framework, hate crime legislation may not be. The former but not the latter constitutes a thought crime. I define a thought crime as one where an agent’s motivation is not just relevant but sufficient to take an act from the domain of the non-punishable to the domain of the punishable. Ignoring a woman’s sexist motivation in procuring an abortion suddenly renders her act of abortion legal. On the other hand, discounting an agent’s bias in committing a hate motivated assault or murder does not transform the act from a punishable one to a non-punishable one. Assaulting or murdering is already a crime.
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Notes
These two states are: Illinois (720 Illinois Abortion Law 510/6 (8) of 1975) (“No person shall intentionally perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus.”) and Pennsylvania (Abortion Control Act of 1989). Minnesota is also considering similar legislation. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29511381/). Oklahoma passed a law (Oklahoma HB 1595) prohibiting sex selective abortions but it was ruled unconstitutional on grounds unrelated to the issue of abortion. (http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/court-strikes-down-intrusive-ok-abortion-law-declares-unconstitutional).
My analysis does not consider non-discrimination employment legislation. While these types of laws also look to bias, they do not make employment discrimination a crime. They simply permit the prospective employee to seek monetary damages. My argument considers only criminal legislation.
Anti-Defamation League, Model Legislation for Bias Motivated Crimes. http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/text_legis.asp.
Anti-Defamation League, Model Legislation for Bias Motivated Crimes. http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/text_legis.asp.
I say “generally accepted” because while most scholarly works accepts the necessity of an “act” for criminal liability, there is work that questions it (see, e.g., Husak 1998, 2007; Simester 1998). For instance, in lieu of an act, Douglas Husak posits the requirement of control (whether an agent has control over something that has happened). My analysis does not hinge on this debate. The important point is that the actus reus requirement interpreted even as a signifier of control is an objective element, one that is not about what the agent thinks but about an outwardly state of affairs.
John Rawls’ account in Political Liberalism articulates the classic liberal distinction between the right and the good (Rawls 1996 [1993]).
Such a proposal may infringe free speech rights (see Schaibley 1981), considerations that are beyond the scope of this essay.
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Acknowledgments
I presented earlier versions of this paper at a conference on reproductive technologies at the University of Minnesota Law School and the Legal Studies Workshop at Dartmouth. I received important feedback at these venues. In particular, I thank Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ann Bumpus, Susan Brison, John Carey, Glenn Cohen, Larry Crocker, Elvin Lim, James Murphy, Ronald C. Den Otter, and Lucas Swaine for their helpful comments. I also thank Suneal Bedi for providing feedback I could not have done without. I thank the anonymous reviewer for providing comments to sharpen and clarify the argument.
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Bedi, S. Why a Criminal Prohibition on Sex Selective Abortions Amounts to a Thought Crime. Criminal Law, Philosophy 5, 349–360 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9123-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9123-z