Abstract
If the central problem in philosophical ethics is determining and defining the scope of moral value, our normative ethical theories must be able to explain on what basis and to what extent entities have value. The scientific foundation of contemporary biosemiotic theory grounds a theory of moral value capable of addressing this problem. Namely, it suggests that what is morally relevant is semiosis. Within this framework, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all living things thereby offering us an ecological, as opposed to merely environmental, ethic. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that living things are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural relational properties—their ability to signify. This consequence establishes a hierarchy of inherent moral value based on the scope of signification: the larger the Umwelten, the greater the value. This paper argues that a robust semiotic moral theory can take into account a much wider scope of inherent value.. These consequences have positive ramifications for environmental ethics in their recognition of the natural ecological networks in which each organism is bound. This presentation of a biosemiotic model of value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic/moral relationships with living things while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries.
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Notes
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html (section three) accessed 6.17.11.
For a historical overview of this codification, see Bekoff 2010, 635–642.
We would have to, of course, tell a much more detailed story about what we mean by “sufficient justification.” The epistemic problem must be vetted against and in context of our best scientific knowledge of the world and our place in it. Whatever the epistemological approach, the disconnect between our theories of value and our scientific theories is obvious and problematic. The approach I offer in this paper offers at least strong if not sufficient justificatory support.
See Buchanan, Brett. 2008. Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2008.
Clearly, biosemioticians are not the only ones to deny this dualism.
For an excellent summary of the key theses of biosemiotics, see Kull et al. 2009.
Note the important distinction: semiosic refers to the use of signs, while semiotic refers to the understanding of signs as such.
Following our earlier distinction from Deely, we will assume that Tønnessen meant “semiosic” rather than “semiotic” in this passage.
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Beever, J. Meaning Matters: The Biosemiotic Basis of Bioethics. Biosemiotics 5, 181–191 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-011-9133-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-011-9133-1