Abstract
The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not provide an adequate analysis of the ontological truth conditions of irreducible A-propositions. I show that the co-reporting theory—which holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differs in sense but reports the same event or state of affairs—escapes the objections Oaklander has addressed against the date-theory.
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Notes
The distinction between the A-series and B-series was first introduced in McTaggart (1908).
References
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Acknowledgements
An earlier version of the paper was read at the conference, “Time on Trial: One Hundred Years of McTaggart’s Argument against Time,” held at West Virginia University (April 2008). I would like to thank the participants at the conference, particularly Nathan Oaklander, Quentin Smith, Jonathan Tallant, and Michael Tooley, for their helpful comments. I am also very grateful for the excellent comments of an anonymous referee. Finally, I would like to thank my friend and mentor, Richard M. Gale, for the enlightening discussions we have had over the years.
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Beer, M. Tense and Truth Conditions. Philosophia 38, 265–269 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9213-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9213-5