Belot, Gordon (2015) Objectivity and Bias. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The twin goals of this essay are: (i) to investigate a family of cases in which the goal of guaranteed convergence to the truth is beyond our reach; and (ii) to argue that each of three strands prominent in contemporary epistemological thought has undesirable consequences when confronted with the existence of such problems. Approaches that follow Reichenbach in taking guaranteed convergence to the truth to be the characteristic virtue of good methods face a vicious closure problem. Approaches on which there is a unique rational doxastic response to any given body of evidence can avoid incoherence only by rendering epistemology a curiously limited enterprise. Bayesian approaches rule out humility about one's prospects of success in certain situations in which failure is typical.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Belot, Gordon
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Mind.
Keywords:	Objectivity; Bias; Reliability; Bayesianism
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Gordon Belot
Date Deposited:	01 Aug 2015 20:39
Last Modified:	01 Aug 2015 20:39
Item ID:	11599
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	31 July 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11599

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