Abstract
I discuss and try to evaluate the argument about constructible sets made by Putnam in ‘ ”Models and Reality”, and some of the counterarguments directed against it in the literature. I shall conclude that Putnam’s argument, while correct in substance, nevertheless has no direct bearing on the philosophical question of unintended models of set theory.
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References
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Bellotti, L. Putnam and Constructibility. Erkenntnis 62, 395–409 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-0602-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-0602-7