Abstract
If mysticism, as Coventry Patmore defines it, is 'the science of ultimates,' in what way would mysticism explain the possibility of a profound relationship between ultimate reality as infinite and proximate reality as finite (Patmore 1895, p. 39)? This paper attempts to address that question through the lens of Evelyn Underhill’s philosophy of mysticism. The paper fundamentally works at framing two of Hegel’s triadic patterns of dialectic against the being-becoming binary as engaged by Underhill. This application helps unveil the relation of transcendence with immanence, a relation that is crucial for a structuring of the infinite-finite mystical intimacy.
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Notes
That text has over a hundred occurrences of 'infinite' or 'infinity', mostly in reference to God. Her designation of God as the ultimate goal of the mystical pursuit characterizes her brand of mysticism as distinctly theistic.
For the sake of crisp presentation, I shall dispense with using the uppercase for those terms. The contexts in which those terms appear will designate their usage as referring to the orders or otherwise.
I am aware that the concept of God might connote the idea of a personal God that is distinct from the absolute, but in Underhill’s text generally, and in this paper particularly, God, absolute, ultimate, and infinite are used interchangeably.
In this specific passage, 'Being' refers to the triune God of Christianity that is said 'to manifest itself as Becoming; as the dynamic omnipresent Word of Life.'
This implies that being is immanent in and transcendent to becoming. As an interesting note, Paul Tillich sees an identity between the pattern of self-affirmation found in the infinite being-itself and the pattern of self-affirmation in finite beings; Tillich 1952, p. 34.
See Cormack 2006, pp. 10 ff.
Plato 5th-4th cent. BCE, 1994, Republic 475e – 480a, pp. 715–720.
Plato 5th-4th cent. BCE, 1994, Sophist 247 d-e, p. 992.
Ibid., 248b-e, pp. 992–993. However, as counter-argument, these forms perhaps do not undergo intrinsic change, but passively attract the knower to contemplate them. Change is seen here as relational, that is, from a form not being known to that same form being known by a subject. For a distinction between intrinsic and relational change, see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2004, p. 31.
See also Gulley 1962, pp. 112–113.
We need not, for instance, take on board any Hegelian notion of a complete submission of the part to the all-consuming totality or the assumption that dialectical progression is the unfolding of absolute reason in history as the necessary expression of essential being.
Tillich 1952, 2000, pp. 24–25.
If pure being contains differentiation within itself, then there are determinate boundaries present within its infinity. I do not see any contradiction here for I doubt that infinity implies emptiness. Pure being has full determinations within itself, but since these determinations are intrinsic and self-originating they do fulfill the definition of infinity as metaphysical infinity ─ having the property of self-sufficiency and autonomy (see Moore 1990, pp. 1–2). This scheme also squares with the notion of the infinite as including and overflowing the finite. The finite is contained within the infinite. Since the finite is not outside of the infinite there is no bounding of the infinite by the finite. Moreover, an absolutely and infinitely empty being would be vacuous and utterly impotent, far from reflecting the quality of pure being as infinitely dynamic. However, the problem that remains is the difficulty of reconciling this sketch of the infinite with the medieval notion of God as simple, not composite.
Underhill 1915, pp. 40–41.
Ibid, p. 41. Words in parentheses are mine.
See Hegel 1817, § 163, pp. 239–241. In his Science of Logic (1812–1816, §1392ff, pp. 645ff), when discussing propositions, Hegel argues that present in each of the universal (e.g.: 'All humans are wise'), particular ('Some humans are wise'), and individual ('Gaius is wise') judgments are characteristics of the other two. The individual proposition that 'Gaius is wise' has the element of the particular in it because Gaius is a part of the human race. Also, since the attribute 'wise' is predicated of Gaius as a whole unit and not part of Gaius, there is the universal character of that individual proposition. This illustration shows that universality, particularity, and individuality are not mutually exclusive moments in the dialectic; and especially within individuality, there are universality and particularity.
Tillich considers it easier to envisage the identity and difference between part and whole when we view participation as a process or power. He cites the example of the power of being of a state, in which, the citizens of the state participate. That power is shared, and yet there is the element of difference between the power of being of the state and that of the citizens; see Tillich 1952, p. 88.
Ken Wilber (2000, pp. 4ff) proposes a dialectical progression of mystical development, whereby each phase integrates the traits and accomplishments of the previous phase and also transcends that previous phase. He borrows and develops Arthur Koestler (1967, p. 48) concept of holon to refer to a 'whole' in relation to its parts that make up the lower developmental phase, and at the same time this same whole is itself a 'part' that forms a component of a larger whole in the higher developmental phase.
These two senses of eternity can also be termed 'sempiternity' or 'everlastingness,' and 'atemporality' (outside of time), see Blackburn 1994, p. 126.
Hegel (1827, p. 406) maintains that 'if God has the finite only over against himself, then he himself is finite and limited.'
Can both patterns of infinity be present in God rather then splitting God into two independent and contrary infinities?
Tillich 1951, p. 235.
Ibid., p. 271.
Tillich 1952, pp. 179–180. However, while it is reasonable to talk of the finite as part of the infinite, the proposition that being-itself incorporates non-being is problematic. One would likely be forced to postulate the odd case of ascribing being to non-being. Tillich’s argument that non-being is necessary to make being-itself active is susceptible to the challenge that being-itself has then to contend with non-being as an external and not internal limiting force.
Tillich 1951, p. 205.
Tillich 1957, pp. 8–10.
Perhaps, Tillich’s conception of God as the ground or power of being and not 'a being' renders difficult the perception of God as radically other to finite realities. Wolfhart Pannenberg (1991, pp. 27–28) regards Thomas Aquinas’ conception of being-itself as one that does not reject outright the aspect of God as a being, i.e., a being who is unique on account of its identity of essence and existence. God as a unique being facilitates a perception of God as radically different from all other beings; see Aquinas 13th cent., 1990, Summa Theologica, Part I, Quest. 3, Artcl. 4, p. 17; Part I, Quest. 8, Artcl. 1, p. 35.
St. John of the Cross 1578–1591, 1991, Ascent of Mount Carmel, Bk. 2, Ch. 26:5, pp. 246–247.
I realize that there are discussions on whether the essential nature of mystical union is non-dual (union-without-distinction) or dual (union-with-distinction); see Pike 1992, pp. 28–40, and Stace 1961, pp. 207–250. My paper mainly attempts to map out the metaphysical structure of the infinite-finite relationship rather than the phenomenological experience of mystical union.
'Eternal now' has subtly varied senses, but commonly, it attempts to capture the idea of divine eternity. The infinite as eternal is outside of time, having its being all-at-once. This all-at-once is not to be conceived in a temporal sense. Basically, God is not in temporal duration for past, present, and future are present in God all-at-once. From our temporal perspective, we can understand divine eternity only as negations of our comprehension of time (see also M pp. 119, 155, 345). The issue of the concept of eternity and the possibility of a God outside of time being able to intervene in a world of temporal succession is a controversial one. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, following in the tradition of Boethius (1785, Book 5, Prose 6, pp. 218–219), attempt to make a case for the compatibility of divine life as timeless and all-at-once with the ability to intervene in our temporal order (see Stump and Kretzmann 1981, pp. 429–458).
Another way to conceive of this distinction between succession and all-at-once is to compare the difference between counting consecutive numbers to infinity and the conceptual all-at-once existence of the immense class of infinite numbers.
I think discussions on the similarity and differences of mystical experiences across traditions and the constructivism versus perennialism debate need not detain us here.
Underhill 1915 , pp. 142–143.
Ibid., p. 143.
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I am grateful to my reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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Gan Chong Beng, P. Being and Becoming and the Immanence-Transcendence Relation in Evelyn Underhill’s Mystical Philosophy. SOPHIA 50, 375–389 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-011-0258-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-011-0258-0