Abstract
It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism.
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Notes
While this thesis may not reflect the complexity of Ryle’s own treatment of know-how, it remains an important position in analytic epistemology. Thanks to Brian Weatherson for discussion on this point.
One may further understand neo-Ryleanism and radical intellectualism as offering (a priori or a posteriori) reductive analyses of knowledge how to ψ, though this is certainly not required. For this reason, it is misleading to characterize neo-Ryleanism and radical intellectualism as wedded to the apparently reductive claims that knowledge how to ψ “consists” in or is a “species” of ability or propositional knowledge, respectively.
It is important that anti-intellectualism, like neo-Ryleanism, requires the corresponding ability. One need not be an anti-intellectualist in order to allow that some ability (e.g., the ability to breathe or think or apply concepts) might be required for know-how. One implication is that Noë’s (2005, pp. 285–286) modified regress argument poses no threat to intellectualism.
Obviously, the positive and negative formulations are not equivalent. However, acceptance of the negative thesis makes it extremely difficult to resist the positive thesis. It is therefore no surprise that, at least to our knowledge, those philosophers adopting the negative thesis have almost without exception adopted the positive thesis as well.
Once again, the positive and negative formulations are plainly not equivalent, though acceptance of the negative thesis make it very difficult to resist the positive thesis. See note 22 for further discussion. Incidentally, we should point out that, strictly speaking, radical intellectualism, intellectualism, and anti-praxism should be understood as invoking some sort of propositional attitude. Because knowledge is the natural candidate, we ignore this complication in what follows. See Bengson and Moffett (unpublished manuscript) for discussion.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example.
See the quote from Noë in Sect. 2 for a vivid illustration of this claim.
The charge of over-intellectualization is not unique to the present debate, but appears in a variety of contexts. For instance, it surfaces in discussions of the nature of emotion (Goldie 2000, p. 3), perceptual experience (Hurley 2001), perceptual entitlement (Burge 2003), and mental content (Chalmers 2006, pp. 63 and 76), to cite just a few recent examples.
It is often said that the relevant sort of ability is a counterfactually supporting “complex of dispositions” (Ryle 1946, 1949, ch. 2; Hawley 2003; Noë 2005; cf. Stanley and Williamson 2001). Whether or not one accepts this view, it must be assumed that the relevant ability is stable, in the sense that one typically retains it even in inauspicious conditions—as when, e.g., one is asleep, nervous, inebriated, temporarily injured, and so on (Bengson and Moffett 2007). After all, one may be able to ψ, even though one is not able to ψ right now (because one is napping, say). In Sect. 3, we discuss the claim that the relevant ability must in addition be reliable.
Anti-intellectualism is endorsed by Ryle (1946, 1949, ch. 2), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991, p. 152), Brandom (1994, p. 23), Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996, p. 131), Haugeland (1998, p. 322), and Noë (2005). Cf. Hawley (2003) and Williams (forthcoming), who on one interpretation are anti-intellectualists who hold a counterfactual success account of ability.
Stanley and Williamson credit Jeff King for this example.
Noë (in personal communication) has suggested that there is an ambiguity in the expression ‘knows how to’ that may complicate matters. While we agree that the issues here are complicated, we do not find this particular suggestion plausible. Although there may be something to the idea, compatible with our conclusions, that the folk do not always distinguish between the varieties of knowledge how canvassed at the outset, the claim that ‘knows how to’ is ambiguous is a substantive linguistic hypothesis for which there appears to be no evidence. See below for discussion. For extended criticism of the ambiguity proposal, see Bengson and Moffett (2007, sec. 2).
For both questions in this study, as well as the studies that follow, participants were given the following options: “definitely yes”; “probably yes”; “probably not”; “definitely not”. These answers were collapsed into a dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no) for statistical analysis. The raw data for these studies is available at http://www.uwyo.edu/moffett/research/khdata.pdf.
Here we use ‘significance’ as a technical term that denotes statistical significance. Throughout, we treat a given relation r as statistically significant if r possesses a p value of less than .001 (p < .001), which means that there is more than a 99.9% chance that the relation is genuine (i.e., is true of the general relevant population, and not merely a peculiarity of the actual data sample).
Indeed, Jane possesses precisely the sort of propositional knowledge that is invoked by many of the intellectualists cited in note 7. Specifically, Jane knows that taking off from the back inside edge of one foot and landing on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after five complete rotations in the air is a way of doing a quintuple Salchow.
Incidentally, the preceding tests would remain appropriate even if the alleged second reading of ‘knows how to’ was used by only a minority of English speakers, for in such a case the second reading would nevertheless still be available. Now, the diversity hypothesis may be developed either as an ambiguity thesis (broadly construed) or as a thesis concerning idiolectic variance within a population. The linguistic tests are intended to address the first approach. The second approach comes in two flavors, a weak and a strong version. According to the weak version, that which we call ‘English' is simply a rough generalization over a few, select idiolects (English1, English2, etc.). For the reasons that follow, we believe that this sort of diversity hypothesis is not plausible in the present case. According to the strong version of the idiolectic variance approach, there is no such thing as a common, shared language; there are only individual, speaker-specific idiolects. This sort of view has its roots in the work of Chomsky (1986) and Davidson (1986). While we believe that this view is grounded in an implausible general theory of language, the relevant issues are simply too large to be dealt with in this context.
See Levinson (2001). Roughly, stereotypical implicatures rely on the heuristic that what is simply described is stereotypically exemplified. Incidentally, we do not mean to downplay the significance of the connection between ability and know-how; getting this connection right is one of the most difficult challenges facing intellectualism. For a suggestion as to how this can be achieved, see note 28.
As Soames (2002, p. 68) observes in a somewhat different context, “When ordinary speakers are asked what sentences mean, often they do not address themselves to the question of [semantic meaning]. Instead, they focus on what they would typically use the sentences to convey, or what information they would typically gather from assertive utterances of them.”
Over half of the minority anti-intellectualist responses involved judgments that Jane and Pat are able to perform their respective activities despite the fact that the vignettes explicitly state that they are not able.
There may be an additional, purely empirical reason to reject the diversity hypothesis in the present case. Presumably, a diversity hypothesis is plausible in a given case only if response diversity is consistent across the relevant population in that case. Since less than half of the participants who made broadly anti-intellectualist judgments did so in response to both the Pat and Jane vignettes, such consistency is lacking in the present case.
At the same time, Stanley and Williamson accept the positive formulation of anti-praxism (viz., that x knows how to ψ only if x possesses a certain sort of propositional knowledge regarding ψ), thus exploiting the gap between the negative and positive formulations. Their discussion suggests a view of know-how which combines intellectualism and praxism. However, it seems possible to give a uniform (non-disjunctive) intellectualist-praxist analysis of know-how only by forging a dubious link between ability and propositional knowledge. For in order to avoid the disjunctive thesis that x knows how to ψ if either x possesses a certain sort of ability to ψ or x possesses a certain sort of propositional knowledge regarding ψ, one must hold the prima facie implausible view that possession of the relevant ability to ψ is sufficient for possession of the relevant propositional knowledge regarding ψ, or conversely. The cases described in this section, if accepted, constitute counterexamples to this view, for the subjects in these cases have the relevant abilities but lack the requisite propositional knowledge.
Indeed, Sally lacks precisely the sort of propositional knowledge which many anti-praxists hold to be necessary for know-how. Specifically, Sally lacks knowledge that making swimming motions is a way to escape avalanches.
This version of praxism is evidently endorsed by Brandom (1994), Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996), Haugeland (1998), Noë (2005), and Hetherington (2005). Cf. Hawley (2003) and Williams (forthcoming). Snowdon (2004) and Bengson and Moffett (2007, unpublished manuscript) endorse varieties of anti-praxism. Stanley and Williamson (2001), Braun (2006), and Brogaard (forthcoming) endorse (at least) the positive formulation of anti-praxism.
We believe that the issues here are far subtler than this lets on. Suppose that Sally’s ability to escape avalanches is reliable: whenever there is an avalanche, she makes the requisite swimming motions and thereby escapes. This would not be enough to qualify her as knowing how to escape avalanches. In order for Sally’s reliable ability to making swimming motions to qualify her as knowing how to escape avalanches, this reliable ability must be underwritten by something related to escaping avalanches. The natural thing to invoke here is knowledge that making swimming motions is a way to escape avalanches. But if such propositional knowledge is required, the appeal to reliable abilities buys the praxist nothing. Though we think this point is quite important, since our primary concern in this section is to test the empirical claim that ordinary judgments of know-how are sensitive to the presence of ability, we will not pursue it further here.
Once more, Irina lacks precisely the sort of propositional knowledge which many anti-praxists hold to be necessary for know-how. Specifically, Irina lacks knowledge that taking off from the back inside edge of one foot and landing on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after five complete rotations in the air is a way of doing a quintuple Salchow.
An alternative explanation is that our studies expose a semantic disagreement between those who use ‘knows how to’ to express a broadly anti-praxist concept and those who do not. The comments on the diversity hypothesis considered at the end of Sect. 2 apply mutatis mutandis here.
Of course, the concepts in question might be demonstrative and proprioceptive (e.g., doing this). This enables us to account for the stereotypical connection between know-how and ability observed in Sect. 2. In short, reasonable mastery of such concepts may be achieved most easily—and, in certain cases, perhaps even only—via action. Consider: most of us are acquainted with the phenomenon of practicing a certain motor skill, such as swinging a golf club, until at some point we perform it correctly and suddenly “just get it”. In such a case, we come to see (know, understand) that it’s done like this.
Note that clause (ii) of the following proposal invokes precisely the sort of propositional knowledge to which folk judgments about know-how appear to be sensitive. See notes 16, 23, and 26.
Allowing that the understanding in question may be implicit. We believe that clauses (ii) and (iii) together entail clause (i), objectual knowledge of a way to ψ (cf. ‘Martin knows a great way to impress his colleagues’). We leave clause (i) only for the sake of perspicuity. In Bengson and Moffett (2007), JB and MM observe that clause (ii) does not entail clause (iii) because one might satisfy (ii) but significantly misunderstand the concepts in the relevant proposition, a la Burge’s arthritis patient (1979). Hence the need for clause (iii). In addition, clause (iii) helps to distinguish knowledge how to ψ from the various other sorts of knowledge how canvassed at the outset: in short, only knowledge how to ψ requires a minimal understanding of a way of ψ-ing. This idea is developed in Bengson and Moffett (unpublished manuscript).
Roughly, x has reasonable mastery of a concept C if and only if x is able to employ C correctly in core cases (under normal cognitive conditions). Generally speaking, the core cases are those in which a general failure to employ the concept correctly implies that the subject at most merely possesses the concept. For discussion of mere concept possession, see especially Burge (1979).
It should be clear that our deference to experts on animal cognition does not force us to admit the truth of any and all attributions of know-how by contemporary scientists. For instance, if cognitive scientists were to proclaim that the (subpersonal) visual system knows how to detect edges, they would be mistaken. (Perhaps the visual system is able to detect edges; but it certainly does not know how to do so.) It is also important to bear in mind that, contra Wallis (forthcoming), many attributions of know-how to cognitively unsophisticated animals, such as the caddis fly larvae, may in fact be ultimately scientifically dispensable. For, presumably, many such attributions can be replaced without loss by attributions of some sort of ability. We speculate that explaining the behavior of cognitively unsophisticated animals will at most require attributing so-called ‘procedural knowledge’, which is importantly distinct from know-how, as many cognitive scientists recognize (Stillings et al. 1995, p. 396).
In other words, the folk’s judgments regarding know-how and understanding were significantly correlated. Given this, it appears reasonable to conjecture that some notion of understanding will be an ineliminable constituent of an analysis of know-how, as in our preferred version of radical intellectualism. In Bengson and Moffett (2007, unpublished manuscript), JB and MM provide primarily a priori arguments for precisely this conclusion.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Adam Arico, Joshua Knobe, Dan Korman, Edouard Machery, Aidan McGlynn, Alva Noë, Brian Weatherson, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and discussion. We are indebted to Jerry Cullum, Bill Devlin, Piper Grandjean, Tristan Johnson, Aidan McGlynn, Megan Rossi, and Briggs Wright for assistance with data collection/entry.
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Bengson, J., Moffett, M.A. & Wright, J.C. The folk on knowing how. Philos Stud 142, 387–401 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x