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Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law

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Abstract

This paper studies the use of hypothetical and value-based reasoning in US Supreme-Court cases concerning the United States Fourth Amendment. Drawing upon formal AI & Law models of legal argument a semi-formal reconstruction is given of parts of the Carney case, which has been studied previously in AI & law research on case-based reasoning. As part of the reconstruction, a semi-formal proposal is made for extending the formal AI & Law models with forms of metalevel reasoning in several argument schemes. The result is compared with Rissland’s (1989) analysis in terms of dimensions and Ashley’s (2008) analysis in terms of his process model of legal argument with hypotheticals.

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Notes

  1. This paper is an extended and revised version of Bench-Capon and Prakken (2009).

  2. California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).

  3. Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 (1925).

  4. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364 (1976).

  5. United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977).

  6. United States v. Ross 456 US 798 (1982).

  7. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971).

  8. The advice given at the North Carolina Justice Academy (http://www.jus.state.nc.us/NCJA/legdec94.htm) states “If the motor home is parked on the curtilage of a residence (the area immediately surrounding the home that is so intimately tied to it that it is accorded Fourth Amendment protection) it may not be searched without a warrant or consent.”

  9. Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972). In this capital punishment case Marshall actually rejected a value, retribution, that the founders had regarded as important.

  10. For example, Burger’s dissent in Furman insists that retribution is a legitimate value, recognised by the founders, and able to motivate legislation.

  11. Stevens in fact argues that it would have been possible to obtain a warrant in Carney.

  12. The capacity to be “quickly moved” was clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception.

  13. There is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulations inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. This is intended to represent Burger’s argument in South Dakota v. Opperman, quoted above.

  14. This is intended to represent Burger’s finding in Carney that the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle. This is the test that was introduced in this case to identify situations where a mobile home could be searched without a warrant.

  15. The examples in Ashley (2008) paraphrase the actual exchange. An extract from the transcript can be found in Rissland (1989).

  16. Also a paraphrase of the extract quoted in Rissland (1989).

  17. We use this example rather than the example given in Ashley (2008), since that example greatly condenses the actual exchange. The justice hypothesises that a tent is pitched next to the van. It is not clear to us whether the justice thinks the tent should be subject to search, which would be a case of the test being too narrow, or that it should not, despite the fact that it can be readily moved, and that insufficient weight is given to privacy considerations in the proposed test.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

    Trevor Bench-Capon

  2. Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Henry Prakken

  3. Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Henry Prakken

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  1. Trevor Bench-Capon
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  2. Henry Prakken
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Correspondence to Henry Prakken.

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Bench-Capon, T., Prakken, H. Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law. Artif Intell Law 18, 153–174 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-010-9094-8

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