Abstract
Gossip has been the object of a number of different studies in the past 50 years, rehabilitating it not only as something worth being studied, but also as a pivotal informational and social structure of human cognition: Dunbar (Rev Gen Psychol 8(2):100–110, 2004) interestingly linked the emergence of language to nothing less than its ability to afford gossip. Different facets of gossip were analyzed by anthropologists, linguists, psychologists and philosophers, but few attempts were made to frame gossip within an epistemological framework (for instance Ayim in (Good gossip, pp. 85–99, 1994)). Our intention in this paper is to provide a consistent epistemological (applied and social) account of gossip, understood as broadly evaluative talk between two or more people, comfortably acquainted between each other, about an absent third party they are both at least acquainted with. Hence, relying on the most recent multidisciplinary literature about the topic, the first part of this paper will concern the epistemic dynamics of gossip: whereas the sociobiological tradition individuates in gossip the clue for the (theoretically cumbersome) group mind and group-level adaptations Wilson et al. (The evolution of cognition, pp. 347–365, 2002), we will suggest the more parsimonious modeling of gossip as a soft-assembled epistemic synergy, understood as a function-dominant interaction able to project a higher organizational level—in our case, the group as group-of-gossips. We will argue that the aim of this synergy is indeed to update a Knowledge Base of social information between the group (as a projected whole) and its members. The second and third part will instead focus on the epistemological labeling of the inferences characterizing gossip: our contention is that the ever-present moral/evaluative dimension in gossip—be it tacit or explicit, concerning the objects or the partners of gossip—is best analyzed through the epistemological framework of abduction. Consequently, we will suggest that a significant role of gossip is to function as a group-based abductive appraisal of social matter, enacted at various levels.
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Notes
Many essays included in Goodman and Ben-Ze’ev (1994) offer a full picture of the traditional mislike of gossip, both in popular and higher culture.
We will come back, along our argumentation, to the issue of the negative aspects of gossip when dealing with the weak pragmatic mode of corroboration in gossip-based knowledge in Sect. 2.3.
Some more words of caution should conclude this introductory matter, stating how our analysis is not intended as totally competitive with other theories concerning gossip, elaborated for instance in evolutionary and psycho/cognitive paradigms (on which anyway we partially rely). For instance (Yerkovich 1977; Baumeister et al. 2004; Dunbar 2004; Daniels 2012)—to mention a few heterogeneous traditions—stress how gossip has a role that transcends the informational one and is often aimed at consolidating the bonds and commitments between gossipers at the indirect expense of those being gossiped about. The point worth noting here, is that gossip (a bit like language), is such a complex and multilayered phenomenon that it can afford (if not plainly need) different levels of explanation that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: ultimately, deciding the priorities between these explanations (i.e., did gossip originate as an informational or a bonding mechanism?) faces the risk of becoming a “chicken and the egg” question which we will not tackle in our analysis.
The evaluative dimension of gossip, not concerning gossip in a moral perspective but rather about the moral content of gossip, is the best example of how gossip is eminently group-laden: from the relevance of the shared information (Yerkovich 1977) to the accuracy of a report on someone’s behavior (Ayim 1994; Wilson et al. 2002; Beersma and Kleef 2011), to the moral judgement of such behavior (Gluckman 1963; Taylor 1994; Dunbar 2004; Magnani 2011), sometimes to the point of triggering a pragmatic reaction concerning the individual on which the gossip focuses. It is worth noticing that one should not understand this reference, and all subsequent ones, to morality and moral evaluation in a sense that makes this paper an essay of moral philosophy: we are not interested in providing a moral appraisal of gossip, rather in expanding the well-established thesis [for instance by Gluckman (1963), Yerkovich (1977), Taylor (1994), and Daniels (2012)] that gossip is concerned with expressing moral judgements. In addition, we mean to stress how the attention to a naturalized dimension of morality (Magnani 2011; Boehm 2002) acknowledges the emergence of a proto-moral attitude, which continuously divides the (social) world in what should be approved and what should be disapproved (and eventually sanctioned): this does not require the explicit engagement of complex and explicit moral frameworks.
Cf. p. 25, where we will elaborate on the epistemic unfeasibility of gossip if it mostly consisted of spreading malicious distortions and fake news.
For instance, pragmatic or strategic reasons, that yet are not linked to the object of rumor by a relationship of relevance.
A warrior ant will exhibit a given behavior and a given cognition, and thus contribute to the cognitive performance of the hive, in a way that is necessarily different from that of a queen, and of a worker—in fact ants exhibit a high level of “social resilience” in the division of labour: if moved, they will try to come back to the precedent position (Sendova-Franks and Franks 1994).
It is the exact opposite of a traditional computational model: a single machine is a hard-assembled system, and most components cannot switch roles, and when they do, as in the case of virtual devices, it requires a heavy software manipulation. Indeed, hard storage cannot behave as CPU, CPU cannot become a Random Access Memory, a Mobile Storage cannot become a Sound Drive, and so on. Conversely, the synergetic group could be computationally imagined as a network of machines, each capable of working stand-alone, joining their efforts so that one acts principally as a processor unit, another one manages the graphic output, other ones the storage of data, and so on, and where any machine can potentially be assigned to any role.
The intuitive idea that those groups should not be in conflict or ecologically compete is a pragmatic, and not an epistemological concern.
Once again, it is proper to remember that efficacious epistemic systems do not necessarily provoke positive social outcomes.
As we will see, these constraints, as far as gossip is concerned, amount to knowing gossip and how to gossip, and knowing that coincides with being a member of the group. Cf. the following subsection.
This aspect will be further developed in Sect. 3.2.
Section 3.1 deals with related issues while outlining the actual inferences enacted by gossipers.
To make a trivial example, a free rider must try to find the individuals who have not received any information about his behavior in order to cheat them.
Linde (2001) explores the role of occasions and peculiar institutional artifacts as tools regulating storytelling with a social purpose.
It is intuitive that, in order to proclaim herself a member of a group, an individual should at least know one of these two types of information, so that she can either name the other members (in a kind of membership by association, “I am in the same group as Paul, Mary and Peter.”) or name the objective/commitments of the group (as in “I am a member of the group of those who believe in Jesus Christ,” or “of those who think overfishing should be stopped,” and so on): it makes little sense to imagine that an individual proclaims herself member of a group and does not know who the other members are or what are the conditions for membership. Of course this has to do with the problem of spontaneous assorting (Wilson and Dugatkin 1997), and not with groups that are imposed upon unwilling or passive individuals by external forces.
Such a perspective on gossip is not new, but Linde’s studies corroborate from another angle Baumeister, Zhang and Vohs’ contention that the benefits of gossip reside in its being a tool for cultural learning about the moral and social norms of the group (Baumeister et al. 2004).
Things change when such a repository exists, as in the case of gossip mediated by Social Networking websites (Bertolotti 2011).
Brackets refer to paragraphs in Peirce (1931–1958).
Magnani (2013) explains that abduction (also when intended as an inference to the best explanation in the “classical” sense we have indicated above) represents a kind of reasoning that is constitutively provisional, and it is possible to withdraw previous abductive results (even if empirically confirmed, that is appropriately considered “best explanations”) in presence of new information. From the logical point of view this means that abduction represents a kind of nonmonotonic reasoning, and in this perspective we can even say that abduction interprets the “spirit” of modern science, where truths are never stable and absolute. Peirce also emphasized the “marvelous self-correcting property of reason” in general (Peirce 1931–1958, 5.579). So to say, abduction incarnates the human perennial search of new truths and the human Socratic awareness of a basic ignorance which can only be attenuated/mitigated. In sum, in this perspective abduction always preserves ignorance because it reminds us we can reach truths that can always be withdrawn; ignorance removal is at the same time constitutively related to ignorance regaining.
This is not meant to be a critique of Ayim’s work, which brilliantly revealed the similar orientation towards inquiry. Ayim’s positive bias might come from the feminist reading that she offers of gossip, as she presents it as the—often—sole available form of inquiry allowed to subjugated human categories (women, immigrants, etc.), and it should not be forgotten that the essay was published in a collection entitled Good Gossip, whose aim was to vindicate gossip from the excessive and unreasoned traditionally attributed negativities.
A first objection is trivial, and should therefore be limited to a footnote: considering the nonmonotonic nature of gossiping abductions, we can easily imagine that—in the conversation about Petra’s possible affair—if the conversation stopped with Jason’s observation, or with John’s defense, or with Patricia’s rebuttal, the final conclusion would been very different. This often happens in gossip interactions: being idle and unfocused, gossip happens as it can, and those who detain the most valuable information might not be present and might not have shared it yet. In this sense, it can compare to science in a very amateurish way: a scientist could not be excused for joining a discussion on a field she’s an expert in, without having read of the latest groundbreaking advancement because it was published “just” a month earlier.
They could not be sure about the truthfulness of Petra’s answer, even if they asked her.
This could be reverberated by social dynamics such as “scapegoating,” described by Girard (1986): gossip plays a crucial role in individuating deviants who might bear the responsibility of a crisis just because they display what Girard calls “victimary signs,” signs of differentiation in times of undifferentiation and chaos. Similarly, if gossip plays a substantial role at poietically projecting the group’s self-appraisal, then there is little wonder in discovering that, after the scapegoating takes place, the removal (or killing) of an innocent victim does indeed create a climate of general distention and wellbeing, as if the crisis had actually been solved.
Gossip is often regarded as an exchange where the participants also aim at consolidating their relationship by talking or badmouthing about somebody else (Yerkovich 1977; Gluckman 1963) endorsed this view as well). When that is the case, it could be said that the participants’ aim is still inferential, but the primary objective is to assess each other’s Disposition towards a certain person.
Gelfert’s and Coady’s characterizations of gossip and rumor seem to present two sides of the same coin, as the former places the stress on evidence, while the latter on testimony.
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Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank heartily all the people who contributed, with their discussion and comments, to the development of this paper: in particular master students Selene Arfini and Marianna Girlando for their help in the initial development of many concepts, and Dr. Alessandra Stocchetti for her careful reading of the second draft. Last but not least, we wish to express our gratitude towards the two anonymous referees at Synthese, whose comments, and the attention they dedicated to this paper, were crucial in determining its final outcome.
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Bertolotti, T., Magnani, L. An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge. Synthese 191, 4037–4067 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0514-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0514-2