Journal of the History of Philosophy

Notes and Discussions DAVID HUME AND THE SUPPRESSION OF 'ATHEISM' A curious feature of seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of atheism is that "it [is] often.., said there is no such thing as a speculative Atheist." This is George Berkeley's formulation in Alciphron; or, the Minute Philosopher (1732), and his testimony is supported by such unlikely allies as Anthony Collins and David Hume; for according to Collins: "many Divines maintain that there never was a real Atheist in the world"; and Hume writes: "the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist."' These denials, despite their prevalence and peculiarity, have received little attention from scholars. Nor is it only "religious philosophers" or "divines " who question the existence of atheists; for so does Hume himself. To be sure, the great majority who deny speculative atheism are religious philosophers , such as Henry More, John Balguy, Ralph Cudworth, Thomas Wise. Elsewhere I have examined more than twenty denials by such writers, describing most of them as instances of a tendency to repress atheism. '~One typical example is from an anonymous essay in the London Magazine for 1734: A contemplative Atheist is what I think impossible; most who would be thought Atheists, are so out of Indolence, because they will not give themselves Time to reason, to find if they are so or not: It is rather from Wantonness of their Heart than the result of their Thoughts. (p. 3o9) Because (very briefly) this author proceeds to argue against and abuse the atheists whose existence he denies, I describe his denial as repressive rather than descriptive. Yet consider the following statement from the Twelve DisSee Alciphron, "Advertisement;" Discourse of Free-thinking 0713). p. 1o4; and An Enquiry concerningHuman Understanding,sect. XII (in Essaysand Treatises(1777), vol. 'a, p. x59). '~ "The Repressive Denials of Atheism in Britain in the 17th and 18th Centuries," Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 0982), pp. 211-246. [375] 376 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY courses concerning Religion and Government (~nd ed. 1734) of Albert Radicati, Count of Passeron: 9 to say that Deists are Atheists is false; for they that are so called by the Vulgar, and by those whose interest it is to decry them, admit a first cause under the names of God, Nature, Eternal Being, Matter, universal Motion or Soul. Such were Democritus , Epicurus, Diagoras, Lucian, Socrates, Anaxagoras, Seneca, Hobbes, Blount, Spinosa, Vanini, St Evremond, Bayle, Collins, and in general all that go under the name of Speculative Atheists; and none but fools or madmen can ever deny it. So that the word Atheist must signify Deist, or nothing9 There being no such thing as an Atheist in the world as the Ignorant imagine, and the crafty Priests would have believed, when they brand with this odious name such as detect their impostures .... (pp. 11-12) Although this statement resembles the previous denial, it differs significantly in tone and point of view. Whereas putative atheists are castigated by the anonymous essayist as pretenders or practical atheists, Radicati defends those who have been accused of atheism. It is either the vulgar or fools and madmen who decry Democritus, Epicurus, et al., as speculative atheists. Nor does Radicati suggest that the so-called atheists are motivated by non-rational or immoral causes9 He is sympathetic to those who have been accused of atheism, referring to one of them (who, I have argued, was indeed a covert speculative atheist) as "that great and good man Mr. Collins. ''3 Yet the significance of Radicati's statement is not primarily in his sympathy for those who have been branded speculative atheists, but, as I shall argue, in his suppressing the emotive name 'atheist.' One way of redeeming something which suffers from a bad name is to dispute that it truly possesses , or deserves to possess, that label. This is Radicati's strategy: he wants to relieve atheism of its "odious name 9 His concept of God is so expanded that virtually every account of the world must be deistic or theistic9 As long as a philosopher is willing to posit some kind of absolute--whether it be nature or matter or motion...