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The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games

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Abstract

Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.

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Correspondence to Cristina Bicchieri.

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Bicchieri, C., Lev-On, A. & Chavez, A. The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games. Synthese 176, 125–147 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9487-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9487-y

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