Abstract
Conceptual knowledge inspires imagination. On the other hand, it is a claim to power as well. Multiple knowledge claims often, therefore, are engaged in a contest. This contest can take the form of several discourses. Extant power structures play a significant role in lending (or not lending) a voice to one or several such discourses. To one with the power to govern, knowledge claims flowing from abstract concepts generated in an elite discourse not only inspires imagination but also often leads to ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ that drive governance in the system which leads to action. Norms and rules define actionability of the conceptual knowledge claim. However, for the one weighed by powerlessness in being governed, knowledge claims often get generated only in action, since an autonomous discourse is often lacking. Yet the sheer powerlessness of the authors of such knowledge claims generated in action leads to its non-celebration. It fails to get elevated. It might also wither away. Such actionable knowledge claims of the powerless often then gets manifested as something like an ‘unvoiced’ or an ‘unvoicable’ discourse, in macabre forms of subversion of ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ of the system that leads to a sense of failure in governance among those with power as well. Power, thus, brings actionable knowledge to the fore, but in two different forms. For the power-holder, it takes the form of a ‘deviation’ from norms and rules in the actionable domain through subversion by the powerless, revealing a gap between knowledge in the conceptual and actionable domain that is reluctantly (often tacitly) tolerated. For the powerless, on the other hand, actionable knowledge is living; negotiating on the ‘deviation’ is an existential requirement. This paper is an attempt to explore these dichotomies, how power (and the lack of it) alters the significance and implications of actionable knowledge.
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Notes
The areas we visited are indicated in Appendix 1 .
There were 232,278 gram panchayats, 6,022 block samitis and 535 zilla parishads in India in March 2003. The population per gram panchayat was around 3,000, with wide variation between provinces. (Annual Report, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2002–2003)
Own resources raised by Panchayats along with land revenue (which is levied by provincial governments but is transferred to panchayats) were just around 10% of the total resource flow from the Central Government in the SGRY scheme alone, testifying to the strangling fiscal dependence of local bodies on higher tiers of government.
Our assignment, for instance, came from the Central Government though the geographical ambit of the study was a small part of a province (our institute is located in a neighbouring province). The terms of enquiry that defined the broad parameters of the study were set by the Central agency. A question that came to us was why such studies and projects are not organized by local governments (say panchayats) to give voice to and build up a local discourse.
With a change in the political party in power in the Central Government, the rural employment scheme was launched under a new name in 2004. The structure, however, remains largely unchanged.
According to revised budgetary estimates for the Ministry in 2002–2003, out of a total allocation of Rs. 183.76 billion, the allocation for SGRY was almost Rs. 90 billion. (Government of India 2003)
DRDA refers to district rural development agency formed to coordinate all rural development schemes at the district level to ensure smooth implementation.
Suppose Bihar receives Rs. 10X million of funds and X/1000 million tonnes of food grains (fund and food grain being divided among States in the same pro-rata basis), value of the grain being around Rs. 6X million. At the beneficiary level, valuing rice at Rs. 5.67 (plus 4% sales tax and 1% market tax in some districts), would mean that around half of wage compensation is in the form of grains so that along with Rs. 6X million worth of grain an equal amount of funds are required to pay cash wage. So, Rs. 12X million out of 16X million (of total fund and grain allocation) is the wage component, giving a wage/material ratio of 3:1.
The Central allocation in the scheme is released in two installments each year. The second installment is released if 60% of total available funds during that year (includes unutilized funds of last year and current year’s first installment) is utilized. In addition 75% of the first installment of food grain allocation has to be lifted and 60% of lifted grain (along with the balance) has to be distributed. Otherwise, the allocation of grains is reduced and along with that fund allocation is reduced proportionately as well.
There were around 500 projects implemented through the Block Samithi and around 100 projects through the Zilla Parishad between 2001and 2003. The projects included construction of rural link roads (mud roads with brick soling), school buildings and community halls (usually addition of a room or two in existing structures), concrete local drainage systems, concrete culverts and pools, concrete sheds (chabutra), construction of pucca houses (awas), construction of mud roads (kuccha), cleaning and deepening of ponds or other water storage structures, roughly in order of their importance in terms of number of projects taken up. Except the last two types of projects, others are primarily material/capital intensive. Most of the projects are, moreover, small (in terms of cost) and involves temporary employment generation for short periods (maybe a month). Independent estimates provided by engineers shows that labour (wage) component in these projects cannot be more than 10–15% (with the construction technology that is normally adopted). In most cases it should be even lower. Kuccha roads, cleaning of ponds, etc. is more labour intensive (50–70% of cost would be on wages), in contrast. However, the share of these types of projects is very small. Out of 500 schemes at Block Samithi level, we could locate only 35 kuccha road construction projects (which did not have the phrase ‘brick-soling’ in the project title), and around 20 projects of cleaning or deepening of ponds. These projects are, moreover, smaller in terms of project cost. The average project cost estimate of the 35 katcha road projects is around Rs. 35,000, while the average estimate of all projects put together is roughly around Rs. 120,000. It would be safe to say that expenditure on labour intensive projects was less than even 5% of total approved expenditure in projects at Block Samithi level. The calculations for Zilla Parishad projects are also similar.
In Bhatwara Gram Panchayat of Korha Block in Katihar district, the construction of brick-soled 10-ft wide roads in the village connecting fields inside the village with the highway increased accessibility of the village. Banana is a major plantation crop in the village, which is also exported outside the State and the road links helped villagers ease supply constraints, since trucks could enter the village directly. The demand for these roads, moreover, was a long-standing issue and the villagers had pleaded with the MLA/MP of the region for getting money for the project for a long time (without much effect).
For example, Kuccha works easily get washed away during heavy rains and floods, which is commonplace in Bihar.
In Rampur Urf Rahimpur Gram Panchayat in Parwatta block of Khagaria district the construction of a ‘chabutra’ was one of the works in our sample. Although the Muster Roll for the work showed several mandays of employment generation, the Panchayat Pramukh (who had a wide reputation for being a very honest and active person) was quite forthright in telling us that only five persons were involved in the construction, all of them being semi-skilled workers, masons from outside the village. According to him, the Gram Sevak maintains the Muster Rolls for the purpose of official records and it was not his concern.
The last Panchayat elections in Bihar were held in late 1970s, after which the same elected representatives continued to hold office. After the 73rd amendment and the drive towards strengthening local governments in early 1990s, the ‘old’ panchayat bodies were dismantled in mid-1990s. Elections, however, were held only in 2001. In the intervening period full powers shifted to the administrative wing and as a Mukhia put it ‘that period was the golden period for many local level administrative officials in Bihar’. Post panchayat elections, therefore, the elected bodies had to reclaim powers. In Khagaria district, for instance, Zilla Parishad claimed that they did not have access to records pertaining to Zilla Parishad works till August 2002.
We tried cross-checking with random samples of labourers indicated in the Master Rolls, but that did not prove too effective. To reach the village ‘commoner’ we often had to take the support of the local leaders. In many cases we were told that a particular person has gone out to work and we had no way to verify the claim. The roving sociologist’s methods are not quite adequate.
In one district, DRDA office staff responsible for sending annual reports to the central government used ‘rule of thumb’ (derived from the norms of the scheme) to arrive at the figure of employment generated at the district level. The lower bodies, blocks and panchayats do not send any data on employment generated in that district.
Inspite of detailed monitoring, including project-wise technical and administrative approval for cost estimates of each project, cost inflation, it is generally agreed, is fairly widespread. In a ‘brick-soled mud road’ construction project undertaken by Korha Block Samithi (in Katihar district) in Binodpur Panchayat in 2001–2002 (scheme no.4), a cost estimate of Rs. 551,400 was approved for constructing a 3,000 ft. long and 8 ft. wide road. According to independent estimates cost per 100 ft. of brick-soled road construction would be around Rs. 11,000–12,000. It implies that cost inflation in approved project was more than 50%.
In East Champaran district, Zilla Parishad members claimed that the District Engineer is available only one day in the week and to obtain his signature is a very difficult and costly process.
The total budgeted amount for SGRY amounts to around Rs. 0.2 million per gram panchayat per year and an equal amount of grain. Given reasonable estimates of leakages (30%) and a wage component of 20% (at daily wage of Rs. 60), employment generation would be around 500–1,000 mandays a year in a gram panchayat with average population of around 3,000.
Several studies have tried to compare different programs on the basis of cost of generation of employment. Such exercises are quite common now in view of the proposed legislation to guarantee work to every household in rural areas that is now under debate.
References
Bandyapadhyay D, Sailo K Ghosh, Buddhadev Ghosh (2003) Dependency versus autonomy: identity crisis of India’s Panchayats, in economic and political weekly, September 20, pp 3984–3991
Government of India (2000) Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) for 2000–2005, Government of India, New Delhi
Government of India (2003) Annual Report, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2002–03
Rajaraman Indira (2003) A fiscal domain for Panchayats. Oxford University Press, New Delhi
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Saha, B., Kakani, R.K. Knowledge, power and action: towards an understanding of implementation failures in a government scheme. AI & Soc 21, 72–92 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-006-0043-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-006-0043-8