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B. Byxovskij, ‘Partii v filosofii i filosofskij kamuflaž’, Kommunist, 1967,1, 122–128. This ‘pamphlet’ is concerned with my article ‘On partijnost' in philosophy’ (SST,5, 1965, 1–11). I am rather astonished to see Byxovskij answering — in a review nearly as long as the study concerthe first installment of my article, which, by the way, does not even touch on the most important questions, like that of class-committment etc. reserved for the second part (not yet published). Also, while being pleased to see a Soviet philosopher devote so much attention to my modest speculations about the meaning of a term, I am rather distressed by the fact that the author did not read it carefully. For in several places he attributes to me statements, which either I did not make or directly denied. Here are three instances: (1) Byxovskij, p. 122.: “As it seems, ‘partijnost”, apurely Russian invention, is inaccessible to a translation inother languages.” I wrote, p. 10, note 1: “The term isdifficult to translate intoEnglish, without using a rather barbaric expression like ‘party-mindedness’.” Ido speak German and know that there is in that language ‘Parteilichkeit’. But how would Mr. Byxovskij translate it into English? (2) Byxovskij, p. 122: “‘partijnost' is for Bocheński therejection of objectivity, the synonym of prejudice, of bias.” I said just the opposite. p. 3: “As asserted in Soviet philosophy the doctrine of ‘partijnost'’ is by no means a simple theory. The least one can say about it is, that it is a product of several sentences which, at least apparently, deal with quite different matters... (namely:) 1. ‘partijnost'’ as opposed to problematicism... 2. Partijnost' as opposed to individualism... 3. The doctrine of partijnost' as sociologism... 4. Partijnost' as an emotional attitude.” There is not a single word about the rejection of objectivity etc. (3) Byxovskij, p. 123: “First of all ‘partijnost'’ is supposed to mean the rejection of problematicism, rejection of the fact thatthere are philosophical problems, the solution of which is not known.” In my text, after stating two extreme interpretations of that point, one of which is, that every philosopher holds a solution for every philosophical problem, I said, p. 5.: “What is meant by Soviet philosophers must be something intermediary...: all philosophers do hold a solution for everybasic problem” (andnot forall — contrary to what Byxovskij says). It is unnecessary to list further instances. But I am afraid that some Communist may say that Byxovskij is a dangeroussabotažnik, who renders the defence of Communist doctrines difficult by such lack of attention to what he is talking about; that would be a pity indeed. (All italics in this note were supplied by me.)
Byxovskij, p. 123.
Th. Blakeley,Soviet Scholasticism (Sovietica), Dordrecht, 1961.
Byxovskij, p. 126.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 127.
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Bocheński, J.M. Thomism and Marxism-Leninism. Studies in Soviet Thought 7, 154–168 (1967). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00819125
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00819125