Journal of the History of Philosophy

An Image for the Unity of Will in Duns Scotus JOHN BOLER SCOTUS ADOPTS FROM Anselm the terminology of two "affections of will. ''~ The Almost all the references I make to Scotus can be found in Allan B. Woher, O.F.M., Duns Scorns on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), hereafter "W" followed by page. (I have sometimes adjusted the translation.) For my references to Scotus not to be found in Woher, I use, where possible, the critical edition: opera Omma, ed. Balic (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, x95~ ), hereafter "B" followed by page; or the Wadding reprint of the Viv~s edition: Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding-Vivds (Paris, a891-95), hereafter "W-V" followed by page and column. References to the Quod//bet follow the divisions used in Alluntis and Wolter, eds., God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). In many cases, where texts are not yet covered by the critical Vatican edition, Wolter has used better manuscript sources than the Wadding-Vivds edition. There I simply report the bibliographical details he has provided. i "According to Anselm, two affections may be assigned to the will, namely, the affectiojustitiae and the affectio commodi. He treats of these extensively in The Fall of the Devil, ch. 14, and The Han,un~ of God's Foreknowledge, Grace and Predestination, ch. a9. The affectiojustitiae is nobler than the affectio commodi, understanding by ~justice' not only acquired or infused justice, but also innate justice, which is the will's congenital liberty by reason of which it is able to will some good not oriented to itself [at/st]. In accord with the affectio commodi, however, nothing can be willed save with reference to [the willer] [odst]. And this could be had where only an intellectual appetite with no liberty followed upon intellectual cognition, as sense appetite follows sense cognition. The only point I wish to take from this is the following. To love someth!ng in itself [inst] is a freer and more communicative act than is desiring that object as ordered to oneself Is/hi. Such an act belongs [conveniens] more to the will as the seat of the affectiojustitiae (i.e., innate); the other act pertains to the will inasmuch as it has an affectio commodi." (In voluntate secundum Anselmum, assignatur duae affectiones, scilicet affectio iustitiae et affectio commodi, de quibus tractat De casu ~li, capitulo decimo quarto et De con~ordia, undevigesimo, diffuse. Nobilior est affectio justitiae quam commodi, non solum inteUigendo de acquisita et infusa, sed de innata, quae est ingenita libertas secundum quam potest veile aliquod bonum non ordinatum ad se. Secundum autem affectionem commodi nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, ethanc haberet si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam, sicut appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam. Ex hoc volo habere tantum quod, cum amare aliquid in se sit actus liberior et magis communicativus quam desiderare illud sibi et conveniens magis voluntati inquantum habet [23] 24 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32"1 JANUARY 1994 affectio commodi and the affectio justitiae, are basic wants or indinations in rational agents, postulated to explain (a) severally, the various wants such agents have, and (b) in combination, the unique character of "rational appetite" (i.e., will) in a moral context.s The framework of the present article, however, is a restricted one: to examine the problem of the unity of a will with more than one inclination. And even within that context, my present purpose is quite specific: to examine one model Scotus offers for understanding that unity.4 Section I is a brief sketch of Scotus's doctrine of dual, basic inclinations. Section 2 is a sdll briefer statement of a possible problem of unity in such a will. Sections 3 through 6 present and analyze Scotus's analogyof the relation between the dual affeaiones with that between genus and specific difference in definition. In Section 7, I return to the problem of the integrity of the will's action. I. Traditionally, the will was treated as a kind of "appetite"ma term used very broadly of all agents, cognitive and noncognitive alike...