Argumentative Injustice

Authors

  • Patrick Bondy McMaster University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v30i3.3034

Keywords:

argument, emotion, emotional skewers, manifest rationality, metadistrust, prejudice, testimonial injustice

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to dis-trust our inclinations to trust or dis-trust members of stereotyped groups.

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Published

2010-08-31

Issue

Vol. 30 No. 3 (2010): Special Issue: Reasoning for Change

Section

Articles

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