Skip to main content
Log in

Bradley’s Regress: Relations, Exemplification, Unity

  • Invited Paper
  • Published:
Axiomathes Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Different interpretations of Bradley’s regress argument are considered. On the basis of textual evidences, it is argued that the most persuasive is the one that sees the argument as primarily addressing the general issue of unity or connectedness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Among Russell and Moore’s contributions to the debate cf. Russell (1900) and Moore (1920). A significant episode of this story was the symposium at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in 1935, devoted to “Internal relations”, whose participants were Ryle and Ayer (1935).

  2. As samples of this attitude with respect to Bradley’s regress, cf. Bergmann (1960), Olson (1987), Mertz (1996) (chapter VIII), Armstrong (1997) (pp. 114–115), Vallicella (2000, 2002); Orilia (2006). An ample critical survey of this literature can be found in Cimmino (2009) (chapter I). On the issue of the unity of complexes, with obvious references to Bradley, cf. also Davidson (2005) and Gaskin (2008).

  3. Cf. Hylton (1984, 1990).

  4. Cf. Sellars (1962, 1980).

  5. Cf. Bradley (1893, pp. 26–27).

  6. Bradley (1893, pp. 17–18).

  7. Bradley (1883, p. 96).

  8. Bradley (1883, p. 95).

  9. Russell (1903, pp. 49–50).

  10. Bradley (1910, p. 179).

  11. Russell (1992, p. 350).

  12. Russell (1910, p. 373).

  13. Bradley (1911, p. 74).

  14. Russell (1992, p. 352).

  15. The issue of Bradley’s conception of relations is complex, and it cannot be dealt with here. For some rectifications of the traditional view of Bradley as a champion of internal relations cf. Candlish (2007). For Bradley’s mature views on the matter cf. Bradley (1935).

  16. It is introduced by the words: “But let us attempt another exit from this bewildering circle” (Bradley 1893, p. 17).

  17. Baxter (1996, p. 21).

  18. Wollheim (1969, pp. 71–87).

  19. Wollheim (1969, pp. 102–120).

  20. Bradley (1893, p. 16).

  21. Bradley (1893, pp. 16–17).

  22. Cf. Baxter (1996).

  23. It is to be noted that the shift from the attribution of a quality to a thing to the consideration of the thing itself as a complex of which the quality is part is remarkably natural in Bradley’s philosophy, according to which the ultimate form of any judgment ‘S is P’ is ‘The Reality is such that S–P’. What constitutes the subject can be legitimately moved to the predicate position, so that a question concerning the relationship between a thing (S) and one of its quality (P) may easily turn into a question concerning the constitution of the thing itself (S–P).

  24. Bradley (1893, p. 17).

  25. Cf. Baxter (1996, p. 5).

  26. Bradley (1893, p. 17).

  27. Cf. Cimmino (2009, chapter I).

References

  • Armstrong DM (1997) A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baxter DLM (1996) Bradley on substantive and adjective: the complex-unity problem. In: Mander WJ (ed) Perspectives on the logic and metaphysics of F.H. Bradley. Thoemmes, Bristol, pp 1–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann G (1960) Ineffability, ontology, and method. Philos Rev LXIX:18–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley FH (1883) The principles of logic. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley FH (1893) Appearance and reality. A metaphysical essay. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley FH (1910) Appearance, error, and contradiction. Mind XIX:153–185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradley FB (1911) Reply to Mr. Russell’s explanation. Mind XX:74–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradley FH (1935) Relations. In: Bradley FH (ed) Collected essays. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 629–676

    Google Scholar 

  • Candlish S (2007) The Russell/Bradley dispute and its significance for twentieth-century philosophy. Palgrave, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

  • Cimmino L (2009) Il cemento dell’universo. Riflessioni su F.H. Bradley, Siena, Cantagalli

  • Davidson D (2005) Truth and predication. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaskin R (2008) The unity of the proposition. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hylton P (1984) The nature of the proposition and the revolt against idealism. In: Rorty R, Schneewind JB, Skinner Q (eds) Philosophy in history. Essays on the historiography of philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 375–397

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hylton P (1990) Russell, idealism and the emergence of analytic philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertz DW (1996) Moderate realism and its logic. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore GE (1920) External and internal relations. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XX, pp 40–62

  • Olson KR (1987) An essay on facts. CSLI, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • Orilia F (2006) Stati di cose, esemplificazione e regresso di Bradley. Rivista di filosofia XCVII:349–385

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell B (1900) A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell B (1903) The principles of mathematics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell B (1910) Some explanations in reply to Mr. Bradley. Mind XIX:373–378

  • Russell B (1992) The collected papers of Bertrand Russell, vol VI. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle G, Ayer AJ (1935) Internal relations. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary volume, 14, pp 154–185

  • Sellars W (1962) Naming and saying. Philos Sci XXIX:7–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars W (1980) Naturalism and ontology. Ridgeview, Atascadero

    Google Scholar 

  • Vallicella WF (2000) Three conceptions of states of affairs. Noûs XXIV:237–259

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vallicella WF (2002) A paradigm theory of existence. Onto-theology vindicated. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wollheim R (1969) F.H. Bradley, Penguin, Harmondsworth (1st ed. 1959)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guido Bonino.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bonino, G. Bradley’s Regress: Relations, Exemplification, Unity. Axiomathes 23, 189–200 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-012-9190-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-012-9190-3

Keywords

Navigation