Abstract
Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.
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References
Foley, R. (1993). Working without a net. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Williams, B. (1981). Internal and external reasons, in his moral luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shah, N. (2006). A new argument for evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498.
Acknowledgement
Many thanks to an anonymous referee at Philosophia for some useful comments on an earlier draft of this piece.
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Booth, A.R. A New Argument for Pragmatism?. Philosophia 36, 227–231 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9105-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9105-5