Abstract
In Science as Social Knowledge in 1990 and The Fate of Knowledge in 2002, Helen Longino develops an epistemological theory known as Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE). Knowledge production, she argues, is an active, value-laden practice, evidence is context dependent and relies on background assumptions, and science is a social inquiry that, under certain conditions, produces social knowledge with contextual objectivity. While Longino’s work has been generally well-received, there have been a number of criticisms of CCE raised in the philosophical literature in recent years. In this paper I outline the key elements of Longino’s theory and propose modifications to the four norms offered by the account. The version of CCE I defend, which draws on lessons learned by medical researchers in recent years, gives principles of epistemic diversity a central role and also provides greater specification of three of the four norms. Further, it offers additional resources for defending CCE against Alvin Goldman’s suggestion that there is a need for a “healthy dogmatism” in science, as well as a concern about “manufactured uncertainty” arising out of recent work by David Michaels. Finally, the modified version proposed here is also well positioned to respond (negatively) to a suggestion from Kristen Intemann that CCE needs to be adapted to incorporate a central insight from feminist standpoint theory. In light of the variety of social pressures influencing contemporary scientific research, and the role of science in shaping public policy, I argue that a rigorous social epistemology such as CCE is indispensable for understanding and assessing contemporary scientific practice.
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Notes
The scientific community is often used as an example of a paradigmatic knowledge-productive community but the arguments of this paper can and should be applied to other knowledge-productive communities as well.
Constitutive and contextual values can be positive or negative, so, for instance, if transparency is a positive value in science, secrecy may be the corresponding negative value.
Perhaps the most famous of these are Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s (1985) Leviathan and the Air Pump on the values in experimentation, Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1981) analysis of decision-making in the laboratory in The Manufacture of Knowledge, and Donna Haraway’s (1989) investigation into gender bias in primatology in Primate Visions. For an overview of many of these arguments, see J. R. Brown (2001) Who Rules in Science? An Opinionated Guide to the Wars.
Other philosophers might call background assumptions ‘principles of inference’, but, according to Longino, this does not capture the contextual (and non-principled) nature of most background assumptions. I agree and will adopt her terminology in Longino (1993), 260.
This criterion was originally referred to as shared standards. In The Fate of Knowledge it was renamed public standards. It is my understanding that this is a shift in emphasis rather than in content.
Criteria of relevance will be set by the particular community. In the case of the medical research community, it has become clear in light of extensive empirical evidence that industry-funded research tends to have certain biases. This has led to the inclusion of ‘conflict of interest’ statements as a relevant piece of information for the readers of medical journals. Similar changes have occurred with respect to what sort of information needs to be supplied during informed consent. These criteria can and should evolve as the community changes over time and as new evidence emerges.
It is perhaps worth noting that I endorse the modification to standpoint theory that she identifies as necessary, which amounts to a suggestion that standpoint theorists explicitly endorse empiricist criteria for theory choice (or, put another way, become empiricists).
I assume the irony of suggesting that a reduction in the diversity of theories available in feminist epistemology would be better isn’t lost on Intemann, or her audience!
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Acknowledgements
Thank-you to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) for ongoing support and to Margaret Morrison, two anonymous reviewers, and the organizers of SPSP—particularly Mieke Boon—for helpful feedback on this paper.
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Borgerson, K. Amending and defending Critical Contextual Empiricism. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 1, 435 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0035-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0035-5