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Plantinga and Favorable Mini-Environments

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Abstract

In response to a collection of essays in Jonathan Kvanvig's (1996) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Alvin Plantinga notices that certain Gettier-style examples undermine his (1993b) canonical account of epistemic warrant as delineated in Warrant and Proper Function. In hopes to clarify how his account survives Gettier's purchase, he (1996; 2000) argues that a belief has warrant sufficient for knowledge only when produced in a favorable cognitive mini-environment. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga (2000) specifies a condition required for a cognitive mini-environment's favorability. I argue that this condition falls prey to counterexample. Then I investigate a possible solution, which I reason fails as well.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Malloy Hall 100, Notre Dame, IN, 46556-4619, U.S.A. Phone

    T. M. Botham

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  1. T. M. Botham
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Botham, T.M. Plantinga and Favorable Mini-Environments. Synthese 135, 431–441 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023551725580

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023551725580

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