Abstract
Kripke has argued that definitions of units of measurements provide examples of statements that are both contingent and a priori. In this paper I argue that definitions of units of measurement are intended to be stipulations of what Kripke calls “theoretical identities”: a stipulation that two terms will have the same rigid designation. Hence such a definition is both a priori and necessary. The necessity arises because such definitions appeal to natural kind properties only, which on Kripke's account are necessary.
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Van Brakel, J. Units of measurement and natural kinds: Some kripkean considerations. Erkenntnis 33, 297–317 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00717589
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00717589