Abstract
Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
It should be pointed out that quite a few members of the virtue-ethical family are anti-theoretical, which means that they are not just opposed to deontology or consequentialism but also to ethical theorizing as such. Such anti-theoretical versions of virtue ethics are not what I have in mind here, but rather the kind of approach best exemplified by a theorist like Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). Michael Slote (2001) is a good example of a non-Aristotelian virtue theorist.
Railton (1984, p. 153).
Pettit and Brennan (1986, pp. 438–39).
Although a consequentialist like Frank Jackson, when discussing subjective vs. objective consequentialism (1991, p. 466), uses reasoning very similar to Korsgaard’s ideas about the point of ethical theory.
The possibility that an ethical theory might be self-effacing and yet correct is maintained by Derek Parfit (1984, pp. 40–43). It is obviously a stance that one might take, although not even Parfit really shoulders the methodological burden such a stance carries with it.
Similar arguments are provided by Marcia Baron (1995), but they share the same failing.
An obvious possibility for Kantians is to argue that the relevant reflective endorsement is never situational and an example of this can be found in Onora O’Neill (1989, Chapter 8). Such attempts are however likely to suffer from the same kind of stability problems which tend to plague rule-utilitarianism with respect to those individual situations where the favored general mode of thinking is clearly possible to apply directly.
Were one to formulate an explicit Aristotelian criterion of which actions are right it would probably run along the lines drawn by Rosalind Hursthouse: ‘An action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances.’ (1999, p. 28) Clearly, this is a principle that it would often be very odd to reason in terms of, but there is no reason why such a principle would not pass the transparency condition(s).
Cf. Timothy Chappell (2008), who argues that moral perception is a form of pattern-recognition.
Cf. Jonathan Dancy (1993, pp. 111–16), who suggests that we understand deliberation in terms of how we identify salient features and figure out the narrative shapes of situations.
For this kind of interpretation of ‘for its own sake’, see Williams (1995).
Cf. Hare (1981: Chapter 2).
References
Aristotle (1999) Nicomachean ethics. Irwin TH (trans) Hackett, Indianapolis
Baron M (1995) Kantian ethics almost without apology. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Bradley FH (1927) Ethical studies, 2nd edn. Clarendon, Oxford
Chappell T (2008) Moral perception. Philosophy 83:421–437 doi:10.1017/S0031819108000818
Dancy J (1993) Moral reasons. Blackwell, Oxford
Hare RM (1981) Moral thinking. Clarendon, Oxford
Herman B (1993) The practice of moral judgment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Herman B (1996) Making room for character. In: Engstrom S, Whiting J (eds) Aristotle, Kant, and the stoics: rethinking happiness and duty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hursthouse R (1999) On virtue ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Irwin TH (2000) Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle’s ambitions for moral theory. In: Hooker B, Little M (eds) Moral particularism. Clarendon, Oxford
Jackson F (1991) Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics 101:461–482 doi:10.1086/293312
Kihlbom U (2000) Guidance and justification in particularistic ethics. Bioethics 14:287–309 doi:10.1111/1467-8519.00199
Korsgaard C (1996) The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
McDowell J (1998) Mind, value, and reality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Nussbaum M (2001) Women and human development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
O’Neill O (1989) Constructions of reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon, Oxford
Pettit P, Brennan G (1986) Restrictive consequentialism. Australas J Philos 64:438–455 doi:10.1080/00048408612342631
Railton P (1984) Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philos Public Aff 13:134–171
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Rawls J (1993) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York
Slote M (2001) Morals from motives. Oxford University Press, New York
Väyrynen P (2006) Ethical theories and moral guidance. Utilitas 18:291–309 doi:10.1017/S0953820806002056
Williams B (1981) Moral luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Williams B (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Fontana, London
Williams B (1995) Acting as the virtuous person acts. In: Heinaman R (ed) Aristotle and moral realism. UCL, London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brännmark, J. Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 449–462 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9160-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9160-z