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Do we perceive natural kind properties?

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References

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my commentator Robert Howell, David Chalmers, Susanna Siegel and audience members at a seminar at the RSSS Philosophy Program at the ANU for helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Berit Brogaard.

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Brogaard, B. Do we perceive natural kind properties?. Philos Stud 162, 35–42 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9985-5

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