Mill's moral theory: Ongoing revisionism

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Abstract

Revisionist interpretation of Mill needs to be extended to deal with a residue of puzzles about his moral theory and its connection with his theory of liberty. The upshot shows his reinterpretation of his Benthamite tradition as a form of 'philosophical utilitarianism'; his definition of the art of morality as collective self-defence; his ignoring of maximization in favour of ad hoc dealing in utilities; the central role of his account of the justice of punishment; the marginal role of the internal sanction in his criterion of moral wrong; his deep respect for common-sense morality; and his restriction of the scope of morality so as to claim for the utilitarian tradition the whole realm of the aesthetics of conduct as part of a general theory of practical reason. © SAGE Publications Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC.

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APA

Brown, D. G. (2010). Mill’s moral theory: Ongoing revisionism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 9(1), 5–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X09345675

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