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Sellars, concepts and conceptual change

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Abstract

Much discussion in recent philosophy of science assumes an holistic view of conceptual systems without providing any analysis of the nature of such systems. For several decades, however, Sellars has been attempting to develop and defend such a view. In this paper I examine Sellars' version of an holistic theory of concepts, discuss some of the objections to this view, and consider what insight Sellars' analysis can provide for problems concerning the introduction of new scientific concepts, and the nature of conceptual change in science.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, 60115, DeKalb, IL, USA

    Harold I. Brown

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  1. Harold I. Brown
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I want to thank Peter Barker, Gary Gutting, Paul Teller, Michael Tye, and especially Richard Burian, for comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Brown, H.I. Sellars, concepts and conceptual change. Synthese 68, 275–307 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413835

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