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JME Online First, published on April 24, 2014 as 10.1136/medethics-2013-101499
Research ethics
PAPER
Understanding, interests and informed consent:
a reply to Sreenivasan
Danielle Bromwich
Correspondence to
Dr Danielle Bromwich,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Massachusetts,
Boston, Wheatley Hall,
5th Floor, Rm 10, Boston, MA
02125, USA;
daniellebromwich@gmail.com
Received 28 March 2013
Revised 27 November 2013
Accepted 2 April 2014
ABSTRACT
It is widely agreed that the view of informed consent
found in the regulations and guidelines struggles to keep
pace with the ever-advancing enterprise of human
subjects research. Over the last 10 years, there have
been serious attempts to rethink informed consent so
that it conforms to our considered judgments about
cases where we are confident valid consent has been
given. These arguments are influenced by an argument
from Gopal Sreenivasan, which apparently shows that a
potential participant’s consent to research participation
can be perfectly valid even if she fails to understand
the risk-benefit profile of the study. I argue that
Sreenivasan’s argument fails. The set of clinical trials
that is supposed to be ethical in the face of this kind of
ignorance is empty. However, I argue that his argument
is nonetheless instructive in allowing us to identify three
important but neglected areas for future conceptual
research on informed consent. I close by arguing that
research on these identified questions promises to yield
a defensible view of consent, lessen the burden of
ambiguity on researchers attempting to obtain consent
to research participation, and facilitate socially valuable
research.
INTRODUCTION
To cite: Bromwich D. J Med
Ethics Published Online First:
[please include Day Month
Year] doi:10.1136/
medethics-2013-101499
Some think that informed consent has received too
much scholarly attention in research ethics.1–3 It is
not a necessary condition of ethical medical
research, and regulatory oversight protects against
the kind of coercion and deception that clearly
invalidates consent.4 Yet despite the attention it has
received, significant problems remain that require
resolution.
Nearly 30 years have passed since the first studies
were published on the therapeutic misconception
showing that many patient participants confuse the
aims of clinical research with the aims of clinical
care.5 Since then, a wide range of studies show that
many otherwise competent adults fail to adequately
understand what is disclosed to them about the
research that they have enrolled in.6 7 The standard
view of informed consent tells us that adequate
understanding of what is disclosed is a necessary
condition of valid consent to medical research participation.8–12 But when this view is taken together
with the studies on poor participant comprehension, it implies that many otherwise unproblematic
trials are, in fact, unethical since researchers failed
to obtain valid consent to medical research participation that morally required it. This is a surprising
conclusion. If we think that many of these trials are
Bromwich
D. J Med Article
Ethics 2014;0:1–5.
Copyright
authordoi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101499
(or their employer) 2014.
still ethical, we must revisit the standard view of
informed consent.
More recently, the move to calibrate the rigours
of the consent process to the risks of the research
also demonstrates the need for a more systematic
analysis of informed consent. Many scholars and
regulators worry that researchers are excessively
burdened, and that socially valuable research is
impeded by the over-regulation of low-risk
research.13 14 But appropriately modernising the
current regulations for obtaining valid consent to
medical research participation involves more than
merely paying attention to the risks of the study; it
requires a proper understanding of the purpose of
consent and the protection it offers. A defensible
and appropriately risk-adapted approach to
informed consent, for example, would need to work
out how the process can be attentive to the risks of
the research without attenuating the quality of the
consent obtained.
These problems alone suggest that the view of
informed consent found in the regulations and guidelines struggles to keep pace with the ever-advancing
enterprise of human subjects research. But rather
than give up on what some think is a ‘culturally
biased, legalistic, ritualistic and unevenly enforced’15
practice, these problems give us the opportunity to
reflect upon its purpose and revise it so that it conforms to our considered judgments about cases
where we are confident valid consent has been given.
Over the last 10 years, there have been several serious
attempts to do just this.16–19 These attempts are all
influenced by an argument from Gopal Sreenivasan.
He argues that a potential participant’s consent to
research participation can be perfectly valid even if
she fails to understand the risk-benefit profile of the
study. Many think that the value of Sreenivasan’s
argument lies in this result: he supposedly shows that
some clinical trials are ethical in the face of known
misconception. In what follows, I argue that
Sreenivasan’s argument fails. The set of clinical trials
that is supposed to be ethical in the face of this kind
of ignorance or misconception is empty. I argue that
the value of Sreenivasan’s argument lies in a distinction he makes between the purpose of the informational requirements for informed consent: the
disclosure and understanding requirements. This distinction allows us to identify three important but
neglected areas for future research on informed
consent to medical research participation.
SREENIVASAN’S ARGUMENT
Sreenivasan’s argument starts from the expected
moral cost of enforcing the standard view of
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1
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Research ethics
informed consent’s understanding requirement in light of the
prevalence of poor participant comprehension of what is disclosed.16 20 He writes:
…given the difficulty in achieving adequate comprehension of
the standard disclosure in a suitable number of prospective subjects, a predictable consequence of enforcing a requirement of
adequate comprehension will be to imperil clinical research of
considerable moral value and importance. Hence, our justification for this requirement had better be pretty impressive, so as to
warrant a moral cost of that magnitude.20
One plausible justification runs as follows. The requirement
of adequate comprehension gives prospective participants the
opportunity to protect their interests. When in the grips of the
therapeutic misconception, patient participants frequently fail to
grasp a trial’s true risk-benefit ratio. In failing to adequately
understand this aspect of the research, they are not well placed
to protect their interests. However, Sreenivasan argues that
there is a set of trials that is ethically unaffected by ignorance of
this sort.
The trials that Sreenivasan has in mind are those that pass
research ethics committee (REC) review, comply with the regulations, are beyond Phase I testing and have a favourable riskdirect benefit ratio. This is a ratio that remains favourable ‘even
when direct benefit to the participant is the only benefit taken
into account’.16 When a competent adult voluntarily agrees to
participate in such a trial after receiving relevant information
about the research, Sreenivasan claims that her consent is ‘perfectly valid’16 even if she is ignorant of the trial’s true riskbenefit ratio. He derives this claim from a purpose that is served
by the understanding requirement for valid informed consent: it
affords a prospective participant the opportunity to protect her
interests by grasping exactly what she is authorising. However,
when a trial is properly and independently assessed, and when it
has a favourable risk-direct benefit ratio, the trial is in the participant’s clinical interests anyway. Her ignorance of or misconception about the ratio does not change the fact that her clinical
interests are protected. Sreenivasan concludes that such trials
have a ‘good claim to being ethical’16 despite the prevalence of
the therapeutic misconception.
ANALYSING SREENIVASAN’S ARGUMENT
By restricting his argument to trials with a favourable risk-direct
benefit ratio, Sreenivasan excludes the kinds of clinical trials that
most research ethicists find troubling in the face of known misconception. When the research offers net benefits, a potential
participant’s confusion about the trial’s true risk-benefit ratio is
not especially worrying. However, when the research poses net
risks, a potential participant’s ignorance of the ways in which
research participation is riskier than standard care might give us
cause for concern.
That said, Sreenivasan does appear to identify a set of trials
where a patient participant’s therapeutic misconception or
ignorance of the study’s true risk-benefit profile neither invalidates her proffered consent nor requires that the socially valuable research she has agreed to take part in be terminated. If
that set is full of socially valuable research, his argument yields a
modest result: some clinical trials are not—or should not be—
jeopardised by the prevalence of the therapeutic misconception.
However, in what follows, I argue that very few trials have this
favourable risk-direct benefit ratio, and those that do, preclude
the possibility of the therapeutic misconception. Sreenivasan,
therefore, fails to identify any socially valuable clinical trials that
2
are ethical when enrolled participants suffer from such a
misconception.
Very few trials have favourable risk-direct benefit ratio
Sreenivasan’s argument is plausible only insofar as it is restricted
to trials with a favourable risk-direct benefit ratio. The result is
only important insofar as there are many trials for which there
is a favourable risk-direct benefit ratio. However, this ratio
applies to very few trials. This ratio excludes all Phase 0 and I
research, and most Phase II, III and IV research, even though
this research is carried out only after evidence of effectiveness
has been obtained and may directly benefit participants.
Consider a plausible candidate for a trial in which the relation
between risks and potential benefits is directly favourable to participants: a randomised controlled trial (RCT) designed to
compare the efficacy of two medically indicated treatments.
Suppose that this RCT satisfies clinical equipoise since sincere
disagreement exists among physicians about the preferred treatment, and so, neither treatment is known to be inferior. This
trial might therefore appear to have a favourable risk-direct
benefit ratio: after all, just as in clinical practice, patients who
have the condition and visit a physician may be prescribed
either medically indicated treatment depending upon their physician, so in clinical research, participants who have the condition
and are enrolled in this trial may be prescribed either medically
indicated treatment depending upon their randomised assignment. In this instance, clinical care and clinical research appear
to be directly analogous, which provides prima facie reason to
think that this RCT is neither riskier nor offers the prospect of
less direct benefit than standard care.
But appearances are deceiving. Clinical research requires the
collection of data via procedures that are not clinically indicated,
including blood draws, scans, biopsies, lumbar punctures and so
forth. These are necessary in order to collect the data required
to answer the scientific question. But these additional procedures pose risks to participants without offering direct benefits.
So while Phase III and IV equipoise-satisfying treatment trials
might appear to be rather innocuous—thereby qualifying as
favourable risk-direct benefit—this is rarely the case because
such trials almost always pose more risk to participants than
standard care while offering the same prospect for direct
benefit. Thus, even trials that seem like excellent candidates for
the favourable risk-direct benefit ratio that Sreenivasan thinks
will justify research without adequate understanding of what is
disclosed do not actually have that risk-benefit ratio.
A favourable risk-direct benefit ratio precludes the
therapeutic misconception
Even though these trials do not have a favourable risk-direct
benefit ratio, Sreenivasan identifies some that do. The problem
is that the trials identified are net benefit trials, and they preclude the possibility of the therapeutic misconception.
A favourable risk-direct benefit ratio will only properly apply
to research that is directly beneficial and yet does not require
additional procedures—for example, quality improvement initiatives or studies of clinical practice that need no more than clinical outcomes to answer the scientific question. These studies
are on the cusp of what qualifies as clinical research, and they
are a minority of clinical trials. Moreover, since in these trials
participants are correct to believe that they are receiving care
that is directed at their wellbeing, they do not actually suffer
from the therapeutic misconception. If the research offers the
patient participants net benefits, there are no failures in understanding of the sort that motivated Sreenivasan’s argument.
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Research ethics
Thus, even the very few trials that have a favourable risk-direct
benefit ratio are not—and cannot be—jeopardised by the therapeutic misconception.
In sum, Sreenivasan fails to identify any clinical trials that are
ethically permissible in the face of the therapeutic misconception. A favourable risk-direct benefit ratio excludes Phase III and
IV equipoise-satisfying treatment trials, and it only includes net
benefit trials where participants are correct to have a therapeutic
conception. He therefore fails to show that the vast swathes of
socially valuable research that motivated his argument can be
ethically carried out if participants are ignorance of the study’s
true risk-benefit profile.
Sreenivasan’s argument is predicated on a favourable
risk-direct benefit ratio
The arguments thus far might suggest a response: if
Sreenivasan’s argument fails because it is restricted to trials with
a favourable risk-direct benefit ratio, then his argument should
be modestly extended to cover all low-risk research.
However, if Sreenivasan’s argument were extended in this
way, the justification for not requiring adequate comprehension
would be lost. What explains why it is permissible to enrol a
patient participant who does not understand the trial’s true riskbenefit profile in to a favourable risk-direct benefit trial is that
her clinical interests are already protected. But if the research
activity is riskier than standard care (as it is in all cases other
than the favourable risk-direct benefit case), her clinical interests
are not protected. Moreover, her ignorance of the trial’s true
risk-benefit ratio means that she is not well placed to protect her
interests. As Sreenivasan himself acknowledges, the plausibility
of his argument depends upon its restriction to trials with a
favourable risk-direct benefit ratio. However, this restriction also
explains why his argument fails.
LESSONS FROM SREENIVASAN’S ARGUMENT
Research ethicists are not mistaken in thinking that
Sreenivasan’s argument is important. The mistake has been to
think that the value of his argument lies in the conclusion that
some clinical trials are ethical despite known misconceptions
among participants. The value actually lies in its theoretical
setup. It is there that Sreenivasan gestures towards a way of
avoiding the unpalatable ethical conclusions that seem to follow
from the data on the therapeutic misconception.
If the standard view of informed consent is correct, these data
imply that many otherwise ethical clinical trials are unethical,
and that many trials currently in progress should be stopped.
However, Sreenivasan points out that these conclusions follow
only if we assume that the purpose of disclosure is the achievement of understanding. But he suspects that this assumption
arises from confusion. He claims that the doctrine of informed
consent is just composed of two duties: (1) the duty to disclose
and (2) the duty to obtain voluntary consent.16 21 The assumption that everything that ought to be disclosed must also be
understood arises from a mistaken tendency to interpret the two
separate duties as one unified requirement. What we aim to do,
when discharging the duty to disclose, is to deliver information
with the hope that that information will be understood. But it
hardly follows from that aspiration that actual comprehension is
a requirement of disclosure. If he is right to think that the standard view’s substantial understanding requirement arises from
confusing an ethical aspiration with an ethical requirement, participants might not need to understand very much at all to give
valid consent to research participation. This observation alone
allows us to identify three important, but neglected research
Bromwich D. J Med Ethics 2014;0:1–5. doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101499
questions on
participation.
informed
consent
to
medical
research
What is the relationship between the requirements for valid
informed consent?
Consider this question with reference to the informational
requirements for valid informed consent: disclosure and understanding. A recent argument from Tom Walker suggests that
Sreenivasan is right that the purpose of disclosure is not the
achievement of understanding.18 Walker argues that information
serves different purposes in the informed consent process. Some
information is required in order to successfully consent to the
activity in question. But other information is required in order
to make an informed decision about whether to give or refuse
consent. Walker’s argument implies that what needs to be understood in order to give valid consent is less than what ought to
be disclosed to ensure that potential participants have an opportunity to make an intelligent decision about whether to consent
or not.
This is a promising development, but more conceptual
research is required on the informational requirements for
informed consent. After all, it is widely agreed that disclosure
and understanding are necessary conditions of valid informed
consent. But if Walker is correct that the profferer of consent
can understand enough to give valid consent without understanding everything required to make an informed decision
about whether to give or refuse consent, what explains why
failing to disclose more than is necessary for a valid token of
consent invalidates consent to medical research participation?
The answer might well lie in the relationship between disclosure and voluntariness. It is widely accepted that prospective participants must voluntarily agree to research participation. Yet the
kinds of facts expected to be relevant to a prospective participant’s enrolment decision are not publicly known. The disclosure portion of the informed consent process therefore puts
researchers in a position of considerable power. By withholding
certain facts or disclosing them unclearly, a researcher exercises
illegitimate control over a participant’s enrolment decision and
this control can compromise the voluntariness of consent. But
when a researcher discharges her duty to disclose properly, she
outlines all the relevant information in an appropriate manner
thereby avoiding the pitfalls of obtaining consent fraudulently
or dishonestly.
All this suggests that Sreenivasan is right to claim that an aim
of disclosure is to give prospective participants the opportunity
to understand information that might be relevant to their enrolment decisions. He is also right that it does not follow from
that aim that prospective participants must also understand all
the information disclosed. Future research should explore
whether or not there is another purpose of disclosure that
entails that prospective participants do need to understand
everything they are told about the research.19 Future research
on this question would provide researchers and RECs with
much needed guidance about whether it is permissible to ever
accept a voluntary token of consent after a thorough and clear
disclosure if the participant does not understand everything that
she was told about the study.
What is the content of the requirements for valid
informed consent?
Consider this question with reference to the understanding
requirement. If the purpose of disclosure is not the achievement
of understanding, what exactly needs to be understood in order
for consent to be valid to research participation? Future research
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Research ethics
should help us determine whether participants need to understand a lot about the act being authorised (including its purpose
and associated risks and benefits) or very little in order to give
valid consent.
In other domains in which consent operates, the understanding requirement is rather minimal. For example, I can sell you
my laptop without understanding either what you plan to do
with it or the true risk-benefit ratio of the property transfer.
When relevant information about the research has been disclosed fully and appropriately, why think that the understanding
requirement should be any more substantial in the medical
context? In fact, even consent to medical research participation
cannot require that prospective participants understand all the
information that might be relevant to their enrolment decision.
Given the nature of medical research, participants are frequently
asked to give consent to procedures for which risks are
unknown to all parties to the consent transaction. For example,
assuming an honest, null hypothesis, a researcher studying the
safety of a novel chemical compound for the treatment of tuberculosis will not know whether the drug has certain risks. Since
we think that a participant can agree to participate in this trial,
we must also think that it is possible to give consent to an activity when ignorant of some of its associated risks.
Sreenivasan entertains an even more radical idea He claims
that “[i]f reliable independent judgment of a trial’s risk-direct
benefit ratio is favourable, an individual’s ignorant decision to
participate should not be treated any differently from an ignorant decision not to participate.”16 Since an ignorant decision
not to participate in research is obviously valid, why treat an
ignorant decision to participate in research any differently?
Brief reflection on the purpose of consent provides an answer.
Consent enables competent adults to permit acts that would otherwise be impermissible. When valid, consent has the moral power
to alter the rights and responsibilities of consenting parties.22 This
power is predicated on two plausible assumptions. The first is that
we have dominion over our body and our property. This translates
in to a basic right to independence. The second assumption, which
follows from the first, is that others cannot appropriate our body
or our property. The basic right to independence generates a correlative duty not to violate another’s independence. When we
exercise this basic right we permit another to act in a way that
otherwise would be a rights violation.
This analysis explains the asymmetry between ignorant
consent and ignorant refusal. If an individual ignorantly refuses
to undergo an intrusive procedure, then she might miss out on
some tangible benefit, but she is not wronged because not
having an intrusive procedure performed does not violate her
rights. However, if she ignorantly consents to such a procedure,
then she is wronged if the procedure is performed because
bodily intrusion without consent does violate her rights.
While prospective participants may not need to understand
everything that ought to be disclosed to them in order to give
valid consent to study participation, this analysis of consent
implies that their authorisation cannot be ignorant or substantially
ignorant. In order to exercise their rights, participants must have
some understanding of what they are permitting. Without it, it is
completely unclear how they have altered the normative situation
between themselves and the requestor of consent. Moreover, if the
requestor of consent knows that the proffered consent is substantially ignorant, it is difficult to see how she can come to believe
that the normative boundaries have been redrawn so as to permit
acts that would otherwise be impermissible. Future research
should explore what needs to be understood to give valid consent
to medical research participation. This would help researchers and
4
RECs develop comprehension tests that accurately evaluate
whether participants have understood enough to exercise their
autonomy rights.
What is the relationship between informed consent and
the other requirements for ethical medical research?
Informed consent is just one component of ethical medical
research. The all-things-considered analysis of what makes
research ethical is often complicated. More research is required
on the relationship between informed consent and the other
requirements for ethical medical research.
Sreenivasan’s argument suggests a good starting place: the
relationship between informed consent and risk. The laudable
goal of facilitating socially valuable research has created an interest in developing a less burdensome informed consent process
for low-risk research. When low-risk research has been overseen
by an REC and complies with the regulations, commentators
argue along Sreenivasan’s lines: a comprehensive informed
consent process offers participants little extra protection while
delaying socially and thus morally valuable research. But a
plausible risk-adapted account of informed consent must do
more than capture the consequentialist intuition that the
informed consent process should be less burdensome. It must
also guard against diluting the concept of consent. That is, it
must guard against requiring only low-grade consent to low-risk
research, while insisting on something more substantial—something that approximates genuine consent—to riskier research.
Future research on this issue will help guide researchers and
RECs in appropriately adapting the informed consent process to
the risk level of the research.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the value of Sreenivasan’s argument does not lie in its
practical payoff, but in its theoretical set up. Despite not identifying any clinical trials that are ethical if enrolled participants
have a known therapeutic misconception, Sreenivasan’s observations about the informational requirements for informed
consent prompt important research questions. More research on
these questions promises to yield a defensible view of consent,
lessen the burden of ambiguity on those attempting to obtain
consent to research participation, and facilitate socially valuable
research.
Acknowledgements For helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this
paper, I thank Joseph Millum, David Wendler, Ben Sachs, Elselijn Kingma, Kirstin
Borgerson, Marika Warren and two anonymous referees for this journal. An earlier draft
of this paper was presented at the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics at the US
National Institutes of Health. I thank that audience for their feedback.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
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Understanding, interests and informed
consent: a reply to Sreenivasan
Danielle Bromwich
J Med Ethics published online April 24, 2014
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