Skip to main content
Log in

Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Brueckner A. (1985) Skepticism and epistemic closure. Philosophical Topics 13: 89–117

    Google Scholar 

  • Brueckner A. (1995) Klein on closure and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98: 139–151

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffman E.J. (2006) Defending Klein on closure and skepticism. Synthese 151: 257–272

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dretske F. (1970) Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein P. (1991) Certainty: A refutation of skepticism skepticism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein P. (1995) Skepticism and closure: Why the evil genius argument fails. Philosophical Topics 23: 213–236

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anthony Brueckner.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Brueckner, A. Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism. Synthese 162, 167–171 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9180-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9180-y

Keywords

Navigation