Abstract
E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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References
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Brueckner, A. Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism. Synthese 162, 167–171 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9180-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9180-y