Abstract
A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration.
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Notes
But see Copp (1993), who argues that not all preferences provide even defeasible reasons for action. Korsgaard (1996) holds that preferences do not provide reasons unless they are endorsed at a higher level of reflection; see the discussion in Section 4 below. Chang (2004) provides a useful survey of the literature related to the question whether desires even can provide reasons for action, and argues for a novel answer to the question. See also Gert (2009) and the references therein for more recent entries into the relevant literature. This debate is beyond the scope here, and I just assume that a preference for X over Y provides a reason to take actions in pursuit of X.
One philosopher who entertains this view is Mele, who suggests the possibility of adopting “a decision theory that has higher-order preferences prescriptively trumping competing lower-order ones” (1992, p. 296).
One might feel unease here, and object that Kara’s second-order preference to prefer spending now to saving now is really only prima facie and not all things considered. This objection (suggested to me by Luc Bovens) certainly gets something right, namely, that Kara’s second-order preference does not carry much normative force. Instead of distinguishing between prima facie and all things considered second-order preferences, however, I would prefer to slice things up by distinguishing between a mere second-order preference and a fully-reflective evaluative judgment about a first-order preference. For more on the distinction as I would like to draw it, see Section 4 below.
Frankfurt’s (1971) unwilling addict (who prefers the drug but prefers not to prefer it) is an instance of the usual case. Mele (1992) shows that a pertinent higher-order desire is not actually necessary to have a case of continence or incontinence, but this does not detract from my claim that the conflict characterizes the usual case. Mele also argues for a claim that is one piece of what I argue here, that higher order desires are not decisive evaluative judgments (p. 294). His suggestion (noted in footnote 2) that higher-order preferences prescriptively trump competing lower-order preferences, is hard to reconcile with the claim that higher order desires are not decisive evaluative judgments. A. C. W. Bethel makes the connected point that one’s overall ought-judgment can be in a different direction than one’s second-order desire. For instance, he says, “I might conclude that I ought to try to remove my desire to be rid of my desires for such things [as Porsches], on the ground that it is spoiling my fun” (1980, p. 123). In other words, he desires a Porsche, but has a second-order desire not to desire a Porsche. His overall ought-judgment, however, is contrary to his second-order desire, for his decisive judgment is that he should “remove” that second-order desire. Finally, on this point see also Watson (1975), who argues that Frankfurt’s second-order volitions are simply desires, and that “to add them to the context of conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give a special place to any of those in contention” (p. 218). In Section 5 below, I outline a view concerning the proper role of second-order preferences that is very sympathetic with what Watson and Bethel are pointing out.
Thanks to an anonymous referee, Luc Bovens, and audience members at the Midsouth Philosophy Conference for pressing this objection.
On this idea of ranking of preference rankings, see also Sen (1974). Incidentally, Sen does not say enough about the normative status of ranking preference rankings to be able clearly to identify him either as an advocate of the additional normative force view or of the lexical priority view.
In this connection, see also Gauthier’s distinction between attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of preference (1986, pp. 26–29).
Second-order preferences have also played a significant role in discussions of well-being. Peter Railton, for example, advocates the view that an individual’s well-being, “consists in what he would want himself to want” in a certain idealized state (1986, p. 16). Considerations of space and focus preclude an investigation of the ties between the possible roles for second-order preferences in instrumental rationality canvassed here and the literature addressing the role second-order preferences do or do not have in well-being.
See Bethel’s example of similar form in footnote 4.
Indeed, in my (2009a) I argue for a reflective endorsement account of the rationality of adaptive preferences, i.e., preferences à la the fox and the sour grapes. Note well, however, that the standard I advocate does not require actual reflection by the agent. I claim that an adaptive preference is rational provided that if the agent were to reflect on the preference, then she would endorse it at a higher level of reflection. For a little more on this subjunctive condition see my (2009a, Section 5.3).
The way I have stated this view is not faithful to Jeffrey’s terminology, but it is completely faithful to the spirit of his proposal and his subsequent discussion of its implications.
Of course, one could prefer X to Y while being averse to Y, or averse to both X and Y, but the analysis of preference in terms of desire and aversion could be extended in a fairly straightforward manner.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for calling attention to the suspicion of nonsense. The interchangeability of preference talk and desire talk I am appealing to here is not without at least some controversy. I am assuming in the text that an agent prefers X to Y if and only if the strength of her desire for X is greater than the strength of her desire for Y. John Harsanyi claims that one might desire X more strongly than Y but not prefer X to Y (1998, p. 287). James Dreier thinks that preference is the more basic notion and one cannot determine the relative strengths of one’s desires directly, but that it only makes sense to infer relative strengths of desires from preference rankings (1996, p. 252; pp. 269–270). An effective response to Harsanyi and Dreier may come from Krister Bykvist (2006) who cashes out the concept of desiring (he says “wanting”) X more than Y in terms of favoring X more than Y, or disfavoring X less than Y, or favoring X and disfavoring Y, or favoring X and being indifferent toward Y, or being indifferent toward X and disfavoring Y. To favor X, on his view, is to “be positively oriented towards [X] in your actions, emotions, feelings or evaluative responses” (2006, p. 280). So if you favor X, “you tend to be motivated to bring it about, be glad and happy when you think it obtains, have pleasant thoughts about it, or see it in a good light” (ibid.). Although this issue cannot be explored further here, I favor Bykvist’s analysis.
That is, the stated preferences are in direct violation of an asymmetry condition. If transitivity is assumed, then the stated preferences imply A > A, which violates irreflexivity.
I am following Jeffrey (1974, p. 390) in the diagrammatic representation of these scenarios.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 31st Annual Midsouth Philosophy Conference at the University of Memphis in February 2007. I am grateful to Justin Klocksiem, who provided very helpful commentary and several audience members for discussion, especially Chris Heathwood and James Hudson. Thanks go, as well, to anonymous referees whose criticisms have improved the paper.
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Bruckner, D.W. Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality. Acta Anal 26, 367–385 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0113-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0113-x