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W. V. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’,The Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956); David Kaplan, ‘Quantifying In’,Words and Objections, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds)., D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1969. Other articles on the issue discussed here are Herbert Heidelberger, ‘Kaplan on Quine and Suspension of Judgment’,Jounal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1974), 441–443; Michael Devitt, ‘Suspension of Judgment: A Response to Heidelberger on Kaplan’,ibid, (forthcoming). I shall not discuss these latter two articles. In brief, my view is that Devitt's reply to Heidelberger on behalf of Kaplan is correct, except in its assumption that Kaplan's argument is sound.
For discussion of indexical expresssions represented by specially indexed free variables, see my ‘Reference and Proper Names’,The Jounal of Philosophy (1973), 425–439 and ‘Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth’,ibid. (1974), 205–223.
A fuller discussion of this point would show that exportations thus valid on the basis of logical form are always exportations from one relational belief context to anothernever exportation from a purely notional context to a relational context. Further discussion of the notional-relational distinction will appear in ‘BeliefDe Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
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I have benefitted from conversations with David Kaplan.
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Burge, T. Kaplan, quine, and suspended belief. Philos Stud 31, 197–203 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01855293
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01855293