Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Zum Verhältnis zwischen Experiment und Gedankenexperiment in den Naturwissenschaften

  • Published:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

On the relation between experiment and thought experiment in the natural sciences. To understand the reciprocal autonomy and complementarity of thought and real experiment, it is necessary to distinguish between a ‘positive’ (empirical or formal) and a transcendental perspective. Empirically and formally, real and thought experiments are indistinguishable. However, from a reflexive-transcendental viewpoint thought experiment is at the same time irreducible and complementary to real experiment. This is due to the fact that the hypothetical-anticipatory moment is in principle irreducible to physical reality—even though it refers to physical reality and is bound with the empirical use of our understanding. The presence of counterfactuals is the condition of the possibility for thought experiments to become in principle real ones, by means of a series of technical realisations that gradually approximate the idealisations that they contain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Achinstein P., Hannaway O. (eds) (1985). Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Ackermann R.J. (1985). Data, instruments, and theory: A dialectical approach to understanding science. Princeton, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson D. (2003). Experiments and thought experiments in natural science. In: Galavotti M.C. (eds) Observation and experiment in the natural and social sciences. Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 209–225

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson D., Peijnenburg J. (2004). Galileo and prior philosophy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35, 115–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arthur R. (1999). On thought experiments as a priori science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13, 215–229

    Google Scholar 

  • Bishop M.A. (1999). Why thought experiments are not arguments. Philosophy of Science 66, 534–541

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boniolo G. (1997). On a unified theory of models and thought experiments in natural sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10(2): 121–142

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown J.R. (1986). Thought experiments since the scientific revolution. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1, 1–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown J.R. (1991a). Laboratory of the mind: Thought experiments in the natural sciences. London, Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, J. R. (1991b). Thought experiments: A platonic account. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) 119–128.

  • Brown, J. R. (1993). Why empiricism won’t work. In D. Hull et al. (Eds.) pp. 271–279.

  • Brown J.R. (1997). Proofs and pictures. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Sciences 48, 161–180

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown J.R. (2004). Why thought experiments transcend empiricism. In: Hitchcock C. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Malden, Blackwell, pp. 23–43

    Google Scholar 

  • Bunzl M. (1996). The logic of thought experiments. Synthese 106, 227–240

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buschlinger W. (1993). Denk-Kapriolen? Gedankenexperimente in Naturwissenschaften, Ethik und Philosophy of Mind. Würzburg, Königshausen+Neumann

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzoni, M. (1986a). Semantica, ontologia ed ermeneutica della conoscenza scientifica. Saggio su T.S. Kuhn, Mailand: Angeli.

  • Buzzoni M. (1986b). ‘L’operazionismo e il problema dei termini teorici. Epistemologia 9, 39–76

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzoni M. (1995). Scienza e tecnica. Teoria ed esperienza nelle scienze della natura. Rom, Studium

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzoni M. (1997). Erkenntnistheoretische und ontologische Probleme der theoretischen Begriffe. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28, 19–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buzzoni M. (2004). Esperimento ed esperimento mentale. Mailand, Angeli

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzoni, M. (2005). Kuhn und Wittgenstein: Paradigmen, Sprachspiele und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. In F. Stadler, M. Stöltzner (Hrsg.), Zeit und Geschichte/time and history (pp. 38–40). Kirchberg a.W.: Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.

  • Cartwright N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright N. (1989). Nature’s capacities and their measurement. Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Dingler H. (1928). Das Experiment. Sein Wesen und seine Geschichte. München, Reinhardt

    Google Scholar 

  • Dingler H. (1930). Das System. Das philosophisch-rationale Grundproblem und die exakte Methode der Philosophie. München, Reinhardt

    Google Scholar 

  • Dingler H. (1938). Die Methode der Physik. München, Reinhardt

    Google Scholar 

  • Dingler H. (1955). Die Ergreifung des Wirklichen. München, Eidos

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein A., Podolsky B., Rosen N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?. Physical Review 47, 777–780

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forge, J. (1991). Thought experiments in the philosophy of physical science. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) pp. 209–222.

  • Galison P. (1987). How experiments end. Chicago, University of Chicago Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Galison P. (1988). History, philosophy, and the central metaphor. Science in Context 2, 197–212

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gendler T.S. (1998). Galileo and the indispensability of scientific thought experiment. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49, 397–424

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gendler T.S. (2000). Thought experiment. On the power and limits of imaginary cases. New York, Garland

    Google Scholar 

  • Genz H. (1999). Gedanken-experimente. Weinheim, Wiley-VCH

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere R.N. (1988). Explaining science: A cognitive approach. Chicago, University of Chicago Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Gooding D. (1982). Empiricism in practice: Teleology, economy, and observation in Faraday’s physics. Isis 73, 46–67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gooding D. (1990). Experiment and the making of meaning. Human agency in scientific observation and experiment. Dordrecht, Kluwer

    Google Scholar 

  • Gooding D. (1992). The procedural turn; or, why do thought experiments work?. In: Giere R. (eds) Cognitive models of science. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 45–76

    Google Scholar 

  • Gooding, D. (1993). What is experimental about thought experiments? In D. Hull et al. (Eds.) pp. 280–290.

  • Gooding D. (1994). Imaginary science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, 1029–1045

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gooding, D. (1998). Picturing experimental practice. In Heidelberger & Steinle (Hrsg.) pp. 298–322.

  • Hacking I. (1983). Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking I. (1992). The self-vindication of the laboratory sciences. In: Pickering A. (eds) Science as practice and culture. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 29–64

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. (1993). Do thought experiments have a life of their own? Comments on James Brown, Nancy Nersessian and David Gooding. In D. Hull et al. (Eds.) 302–308.

  • Hacking I. (1999). The social construction of what?. Cambridge, Harvard University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidelberger, M. & Steinle, F. (hrsg.): 1998, Experimental Essays – Versuche zum Experiment. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

  • Hempel C.G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York, Free Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Hintikka J. (1988). What is the logic of experimental inquiry?. Synthese 74, 173–188

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hintikka, J. (1993). Theory-ladenness of observations as a test case of Kuhn’s approach to scientific inquiry. Hull et al. (Eds.) pp. 277–286.

  • Hon, G. (1998). If this be error. Probing experiment with error. In M. Heidelberger & F. Steinle (Hrsg.) 1998, pp. 227–248.

  • Horowitz T., Massey G.J. (eds) (1991). Thought experiments in science and philosophy. Savage MD, Rowman & Littlefield

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, D., Forbes, M., & Okruhlik, K. (Eds.). (1993). PSA 1992, 2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, MI.

  • Irvine, A. D. (1991). Thought experiments in scientific reasoning. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) pp. 149–166.

  • Janis, A. I. (1991). Can thought experiments fail? In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) pp. 113–118.

  • Koyré A. (1939). Études galiléennes. Paris, Hermann

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, Th. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. zit. nach d. 2. Aufl., 1970.

  • Kuhn, Th. S. (1964). A function for thought experiments. In R. Taton et I. B. Cohen (dir.), L’aventure de la science, Mélanges Alexandre Koyré. vol. II, Paris: Hermann, 307–337; wiedergedruckt in u. zit. nach T.S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago (Ill.): University of Chicago Press. 1977, 240–265, dt. Üb.: Die Entstehung des Neuen. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1977, 327–356.

  • Kühne U. (2005). Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments. Frankfurt a.M, Suhrkamp

    Google Scholar 

  • Laymon, R. (1985). Idealizations and the testing of theories by experimentation. In P. Achinstein & O. Hannaway (Eds.) pp. 147–173.

  • Laymon, R. (1991). Thought experiments by Stevin, Mach and Gouy: Thought experiments as ideal limits and as semantic domains. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) pp. 167–191.

  • Mach, E. (1883). Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung. Historisch-kritisch dargestellt, Leipzig: Brockhaus zit. nach der 9. Aufl., Leipzig 1933.

  • Mach E. (1896/1897). Über Gedankenexperimente. Zeitschrift für den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht 10, 1–5

    Google Scholar 

  • Mach, E. (1905a). Über Gedankenexperimente. Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Leipzig: Barth. zit. nach der 5. Aufl., 1926, 183–200.

  • Mach, E. (1905b). Das physische Experiment und dessen Leitmotive. Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Leipzig: Barth. zit. nach der 5. Aufl., 1926, 201–219.

  • Mach, E. (1905c). Die Hypothese. Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Leipzig: Barth. zit. nach der 5. Aufl., 1926, 232–250.

  • McAllister J. (1996). The evidential significance of thought experiments in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 27, 233–250

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMullin E. (1985). Galilean idealization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16, 247–273

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miščević N. (1992). Mental models and thought experiments. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6, 215–226

    Google Scholar 

  • Nersessian, N. (1991). Why do thought experiments work? Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 13, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale (NJ), 430–438.

  • Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. R. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science, (pp. 3–44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Nersessian, N. (1993). In the theoretician’s laboratory: Thought experimenting as mental modeling. Hull et al. (Eds.) pp. 291–301.

  • Norton, J. (1991). Thought experiments in Einstein’s work. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.) pp. 129–148.

  • Norton J. (1996). Are thought experiments just what you Thought?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, 333–366

    Google Scholar 

  • Norton J. (2004). Why thought experiments do not transcend empiricism. In: Hitchcock C. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Malden, Blackwell, pp. 44–66

    Google Scholar 

  • Nowak, L. (1971). U podstaw marksowskiej metodologii nauk, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

  • Nowak, L. (1992). The idealizational approach to science: A survey. In J. Brzeziński, & L. Nowak, Idealization III. Approximation and truth. (pp. 9–63). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Palmieri P. (2003). Mental models in Galileo’s early mathematization of nature. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 34, 229–264

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson. zit. nach der 2. Aufl. 1968.

  • Poser, H. (1984). Wovon handelt ein Gedankenexperiment? H.P. Poser & H.-W. Schütt (hrsg.), Ontologie und Wissenschaft. Philosophische und wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchungen zur Frage der Objektkonstitution (Technische Universität Berlin) 19, 181–198.

  • Radder H. (1988). The material realization of science. Assen, van Gorckum

    Google Scholar 

  • Radder H. (1996). In and about the world. Philosophical studies of science and technology. New York, State University of New York Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlesinger G.N. (1996). The power of thought experiments. Foundations of Physics 26, 467–482

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sexl R.U., Urbantke H.K. (1975). Gravitation und Kosmologie. Eine Einführung in die Allgemeine Relativitätstheorie. Zürich, Bibliographisches Institut

    Google Scholar 

  • Sorensen Roy A. (1992). Thought experiments. Oxford, Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Stäudner, F. (1998). Virtuelle Erfahrung. Eine Untersuchung über den Erkenntniswert von Gedankenexperimenten und Computersimulationen in den Naturwissenschaften. Diss. Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena.

  • Stöltzner M. (2002). The dynamics of thought experiments – comments to Atkinson. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disks0/00/00/06/26, 17.12.2002.

  • Weber, M. (1904). Die‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 19, 22–87, wiederabgedruckt in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Mohr, Tübingen, 1922, zit. nach der 5. Aufl., 1982, 146–214.

  • Weber, M. (1906). Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 22, 143–207, wiederabgedruckt in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Mohr, Tübingen, 1922, zit. nach der 5. Aufl., 1982, 215–290.

  • Witt-Hansen J. (1976). H. C. Örsted, Immanuel Kant, und the thought experiment. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 13, 48–65

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. via Caffaro 29/10, 16124, Genova, Italy

    Marco Buzzoni

  2. Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze Umane, Università di Macerata, via Garibaldi 20, 62100, Macerata, Italy

    Marco Buzzoni

Authors
  1. Marco Buzzoni
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marco Buzzoni.

Additional information

Die Hauptthesen des vorliegenden Beitrags wurden im Jahre 2004 während eines Forschungsaufenthalts in Marburg als Stipendiat der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung erarbeitet. Der Stiftung und meinem wissenschaftlichen Gastgeber, Herrn Prof. Dr. Peter Janich, gilt mein innigster Dank. Auch Herrn Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Baumgartner möchte ich meinen verbindlichen Dank aussprechen, nicht nur weil er mir bei 2003 durchgeführten bibliographischen Recherchen in Würzburg sehr behilflich war, sondern auch für seine Einladung zu einer Forschungsarbeit über “Gedankenexperiment und Intentionalität”, die diesen Beitrag als Ausgangspunkt der gemeinsamen Arbeiten im Sommer 2006 angeregt hat. Für die Unterstützung dieser Forschungsarbeit ist erneut der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung zu danken. Für ihre Empfehlungen zu sprachlichen Verbesserungen bedanke ich mich bei Frau Ingeborg Donhauser.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Buzzoni, M. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Experiment und Gedankenexperiment in den Naturwissenschaften. J Gen Philos Sci 38, 219–237 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-007-9032-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-007-9032-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation