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Comments on Dennis McKerlie's ‘Rational Choice, Changes in Values over Time, and Well-Being’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2007

KRISTER BYKVIST*
Affiliation:
Jesus College, Oxford

Extract

I am grateful to have been given the opportunity to comment on McKerlie's interesting article, especially since it concerns one of my pet topics and provides many helpful comments on one of my own articles on this topic. My comments will be brief because I agree with most of his points, in particular, his criticisms of the prudential view and the present-aim theory. What I want to do here is just to clarify a couple of things concerning my own theory, concede some of the difficulties that McKerlie raises for my theory, and see to what extent his own proposal fares better than my own theory.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1 Bykvist, K., ‘The Moral Relevance of Past Preferences’, Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Dyke, D. (Dordrecht, 2003), p. 116, and p. 127Google Scholar.

2 Bykvist, ‘Moral Relevance’, p. 127.

3 McKerlie, p. 00.

4 McKerlie, p. 00.

5 McKerlie, p. 00.

6 McKerlie, p. 00.

7 McKerlie, p. 00 and p. 00.

8 Bykvist, ‘Moral Relevance’, p. 130.

9 McKerlie, p. 00.

10 McKerlie, pp. 00–00.

11 McKerlie, p. 00.

12 McKerlie, p. 00.

13 Here I follow Velleman, D., ‘Well-Being and Time’, Pacific Philosophical Journal 72.1 (1991)Google Scholar.

14 McKerlie, p. 00.