Abstract
Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversionoften conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose aserious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to supportthis conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examiningfeatures of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resistthis generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion areconsiderably less effective than they may initially appear
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Campbell, N. Generalizing Qualia Inversion. Erkenntnis 60, 27–34 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000005130.65887.1a
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000005130.65887.1a