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Independent social choice correspondences

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Abstract

A fixed agenda social choice correspondence Φ on outcome set X maps each profile of individual preferences into a nonempty subset of X. If Φ satisfies an analogue of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then either the range of Φ contains exactly two alternatives, or else there is at most one individual whose preferences have any bearing on Φ. This is the case even if Φ is not defined for any proper subset of X.

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Article 22 July 2014

Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Economics, The College of William and Mary, 23187-8795, Williamsburg, VA, USA

    Donald E. Campbell

  2. Dept. of Economics, Syracuse University, 13244-1090, Syracuse, NY, USA

    Jerry S. Kelly

Authors
  1. Donald E. Campbell
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  2. Jerry S. Kelly
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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Independent social choice correspondences. Theor Decis 41, 1–11 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134113

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