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Notes Toward a Faculty Theory of Cognitive Consciousness

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Computers, Brains and Minds

Part of the book series: Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 7))

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Abstract

On the view to be expounded below, the coordination and control of a person’s behaviour, insofar as it makes reference to cognition, is accomplished by a set of faculties. As I am going to construe things, a faculty is a storage and production facility which can be characterized by its representational modality or format, the kinds of operations it typically carries out over representations in that format, and its processing connections to transducer systems, effector systems, and other faculties, in the production of behaviour. In addition, and most centrally, I claim that consciousness is a faculty affair. Each faculty is responsible for producing conscious states within its representational and operational domain — indeed, consciousness just is the running result of operations in these faculties — and insofar as coordination between faculties is dependent upon these results it is dependent upon consciousness. So it is an error to deny consciousness a systematic role in cognition.

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Notes

  1. See Jerry Fodor (1983) The Modularity of Mind, MIT, and Howard Gardner (1983) Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, Paladin.

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  2. See my paper (1988) `Modularity, Rationality, and Higher Cognition’, Philosophical Studies LIII, pp. 279–294.

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  3. See Gardner, op. cit. (note 1)

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  4. Michael Gazzaniga and Joseph Le Doux (1978) The Integrated Mind. Plenum Press, pp. 13–17.

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  5. The literature here is extensive. Useful sources are R. W. Sperry (1974) `Lateral Specialization in the Surgically Separated Hemisphere, F. O. Schmitt and F. G. Worden (eds.), The Neurosciences: Third Study Program, MIT Press, pp. 5–19, and M. S. Gazzaniga (1970) The Bisected Brain, Appleton-Century-Crofts.

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  6. R.W. Sperry (1984) `Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Divided Brain’, Neuropsvchologia XXII, pp. 661–673. See p. 662.

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  7. R.W. Sperry.(1968) ‘Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity of Conscious Awareness’, American Psychologist XXIII, pp. 723–733, as quoted by Roland Puccetti (1973) in ‘Brain Bisection and Personal Identity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science XXIV, pp. 339–355, on p. 343.

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  8. Puccetti, op. cit. (note 7), p. 343.

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  9. See op. cit. (note 4.) pp. 155–159, for interesting remarks on this in relation to cognitive dissonance. See also Section 3 below.

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  10. See op. cit. (note 6), p. 666.

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  11. The locus classicus is R.N. Shepard and J. Metzler (1971) ‘Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects’, Science CLXXI, pp. 701–703. (Figure 1 is reproduced by permission of the authors and Science. (Copyright 1971 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)

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  15. Ibid. pp. 458–459 and 463.

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  16. For further results to the same effect see Roger Shepard (1978) ‘The Mental Image’, American Psychologist XXXIII, pp. 123–137, and R. A. Finke (1980) ‘Levels of Equivalence in Imagery and Perception’, Psychological ReviewLXXXVII, pp. 113–139.

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  19. See Ned Block’s Imagery for a useful collection of this material.

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  20. Jerry Fodor (1976) The Language of Thought, Harvester.

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  21. Ibid. p. 181.

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  22. Ibid. p. 182.

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  23. D.C. Dennett (1978) Brainstorms, Bradford Books, pp. 167–169. For a more complete account along the following lines, see my ‘Propositions About Images’, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

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  24. Ibid. p. 168.

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  26. Quoted in op. cit. (note 23), p. 160.

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  27. An influential surevey of this material is Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson (1977) ‘Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes’, Psychological Review LXXXIV, pp. 231–259.

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  29. See op. cit. (note 27), p. 233.

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  30. Ibid. p. 248.

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  32. See op. cit. (note 27). p. 255.

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  33. On these and other difficulties see K. Anders Ericsson and Herbert Simon (1980) ‘Verbal Reports as Data’, Psychological Review LXXXVII, pp. 215–251, and Eliot R. Smith and Frederick D. Miller (1978) ‘Limits on Perception of Cognitive Process: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson’, Psychological Review LXXXV, pp. 355–362.

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  34. R.E. Nisbett and S. Schachter (1966) ‘Cognitive Manipulation of Pain’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology II, pp. 227 - 236.

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  35. See op. cit. (note 27), p. 237.

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  37. For references and discussion of the following and other cases see Ronald Melzack (1973) The Puzzle of Pain, Basic Books. Suggestions about plausible physiological substrates for what follows are canvassed in Chapter 6.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Cam, P. (1989). Notes Toward a Faculty Theory of Cognitive Consciousness. In: Slezak, P., Albury, W.R. (eds) Computers, Brains and Minds. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1181-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1181-9_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7026-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1181-9

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