Abstract
A semantics is presented for belief-revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other's beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no effect on any other aspect of the world. This allows us to employ an AGM-style selection function to represent revision. The semantics is given a complete axiomatisation (identical to the axiomatisation found by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld for a semantics based on non-wellfounded set theory) for the special case of expansion.
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Cantwell, J. A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction. J Logic Lang Inf 14, 397–422 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-005-4019-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-005-4019-8