Abstract
The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter‐factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumtion of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative "I will get a better outcome if A than if B" which is taken to have the structure "(the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B)".
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adams, E. W. (1965) On the logic of conditionals, Inquiry 8, 166–197.
Adams, E. W. (1970) Subjunctive and indicative conditionals, Found. Lang. 6, 89–94.
Alchourrón, C., Gärdenfors, P. and Makinson, D. (1985) On the logic of theory change: Partial meet functions for contraction and revision, J. Symb. Log. 50, 510–530.
Arló-Costa, H. (1999) Belief revision conditionals, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 96, 3–28.
Arló-Costa, H. (2001) Bayesian epistemology and epistemic conditionals, J. Philos. 98, 555–593.
Bennett, J. F. (2003) A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bergström, L. (1966) The alternatives and consequences of actions, PhD Dissertation, Stockholm.
Cantwell, J. (1995) Comparatives, Theor. Linguist. 21, 145–158.
Dudman, V. H. (1983) Tense and time in English verb clusters of primary pattern, Aust. J. Linguist. 3, 25–44.
Dudman, V. H. (1984) Conditional interpretations of if-sentences, Aust. J. Linguist. 4, 143–204.
Dudman, V. H. (1985) Theory of predication in English, Aust. J. Linguist. 5, 143–193.
Dudman, V. H. (1988) Indicative and subjunctive, Analysis 48, 112–122.
Edgington, D. (1995) On conditionals, Mind 104, 235–329.
Gärdenfors, P. (1986) Belief revision and the Ramsey test for conditionals, Philos. Rev. 95, 81–93.
Gibbard, A. and Harper, W. (1978) Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility, in Hooker, Leach, and McClennen (eds.), Foundations and application of Decision theory, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 125–162.
Horgan, T. (1981) Counterfactuals and Newcomb's problem, J. Philos. 78, 331–356.
Jeffrey, R. (1983) The Logic of Decision, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Joyce, J. (1999) The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Levi, I. (1988) Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test, Synthese 76, 49–81.
Levi, I. (1996) For the Sake of the Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Lewis, D. (1981) Causal decision theory, Australas. J. Philos. 59, 5–30.
Lindström, S. and Rabinowicz, W. (1992) Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test, Synthese, 91, 195–237.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931) Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York.
Savage, L. (1972) The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd edn, Dover, New York.
Segerberg, K. (1998) Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic, Notre Dame J. Form. Log. 39, 287–306.
Stalnaker, R. (1968) A theory of conditionals, in Studies in Logical Theory, Blackwell, Oxford. No. 2 in American philosophical quarterly monograph series.
Stalnaker, R. and Thomason, R. H. (1970) A semantic analysis of conditional logic, Theoria 36, 23–42.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cantwell, J. The Logic of Dominance Reasoning. J Philos Logic 35, 41–63 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9007-6
Received:
Revised:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9007-6