Journal of the History of Philosophy

604 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~5:4 OCT 1987 and converts. The early reception of the Tractatus theologico-poIiticu.~ in the Dutch Republic is dealt with by H. Siebrand, while one example of Spinoza's influence is discussed by J. P. Wurtz, "L'6thique et le concept de Dieu chez Tschirnhaus: l'influence de Spinoza." This is a rich and well documented volume, its contents showing that "Spinoza's philosophy is a living issue" indeed. Both approaches, the systematic as well as the historical, contribute to a better understanding of Spinoza's position within the context of his own time. The authors present their theses and findings in a way which is stimulating and refreshing, bringing specialist and non-specialist up to date with the different topics which capture the interest of our present-day Spinoza scholars. ERNESTINE G. E. VAN DER WALL Sir Thomas Browne Institute, Leiden Frederick G. Whelan. Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 393. $35 .oo. Whelan's project has two parts: (1) tO show that Hume's political philosophy has as its central theme the creation of social order through artifice, or the deliberate creation and observation of rules; and (2) "to achieve an integrated view of Hume's philosophy of human nature and its political manifestations, calling attention to the ways in which his political philosophy follows from and is firmly grounded in his general conception of the mind" (6). The first part of Whelan's endeavor is highly successful and instructive, but the second part is an unmitigated disaster. In his account of artifice in Hume, Whelan persuasively argues that social life is seen to depend on general rules, that these rules are felt by agents to be obligatory, that these rules are not derivable from any theory of self-interest, that these rules may on occasion conflict both with natural impulse and natural virtue, that crucial to Hume's social and political views is the concept of habit or custom, "the process by which people learn through practice the demands of collective life" (293) . Time and again, Whelan shows how misleading it is to try to understand Hume's social philosophy from an ego-centric perspective and that the social perspective is integral to Hume's discussion. Whelan's attempt to grasp Hume's conservatism is less successful. Clearly, Hume's conservatism is compatible with his critique of inflated rationalistic and doctrinaire programs and with Hume's stress on the importance of custom (time-honored tradition ). But as Whelan himself insists, Hume's conservatism is not a defense of the status quo or a simple acquiescence in past practice. Hume's conservatism allows for the internal criticism of past norms and the possibility of improvement (not to be confused with progress). In this respect and in his critique of religion, Hume is unlike other conservatives and any of the traditional forms of the traditional forms of skepticism. BOOK REVIEWS 605 The problem is how are we to account for the differences? Whelan suggests that we seek for the answer in Hume's epistemology. It is here that Whelan begins to run into trouble. The first half of his book is a fairly conventional summary of Hume as a skeptical critic of all forms of rationalism. Whelan concludes that Hume's skepticism is "mitigated" but "not replaced by naturalism" (81). 'Naturalism' is defined 095) as an "acceptance, for the practical purposes of life, of the fundamental propensities that he observed to be stronger in general than his doubts.., his acquiescing in or deliberately adopting certain of the values he finds there as worthy and appropriate guides for living." Hume, then, it would seem according to Whelan, has two basic premises: skepticism and naturalism. But the naturalism is not entailed by the skepticism. If skepticist epistemology is the foundation of all Hume's thought then it is impossible to show the "unity of the whole" of Hume's thought. Whelan cannot achieve his second objective. Much worse, Hume will ultimately appear to the sophisticated reader as a philosophical simpleton who, for no apparent reason, cobbles together skepticism and naturalism. It is ridiculous to...