Did Ptolemy make novel predictions? Launching Ptolemaic astronomy into the scientific realism debate

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Highlights

  • We present four novel, successful predictions of Ptolemaic astronomy.

  • We launch Ptolemaic astronomy into the scientific realism debate.

  • We challenge selective scientific realism with new counterexamples.

Abstract

The goal of this paper, both historical and philosophical, is to launch a new case into the scientific realism debate: geocentric astronomy. Scientific realism about unobservables claims that the non-observational content of our successful/justified empirical theories is true, or approximately true. The argument that is currently considered the best in favor of scientific realism is the No Miracles Argument: the predictive success of a theory that makes (novel) observational predictions while making use of non-observational content would be inexplicable unless such non-observational content approximately corresponds to the world “out there”. Laudan's pessimistic meta-induction challenged this argument, and realists reacted by moving to a “selective” version of realism: the approximately true part of the theory is not its full non-observational content but only the part of it that is responsible for the novel, successful observational predictions. Selective scientific realism has been tested against some of the theories in Laudan's list, but the first member of this list, geocentric astronomy, has been traditionally ignored. Our goal here is to defend that Ptolemy's Geocentrism deserves attention and poses a prima facie strong case against selective realism, since it made several successful, novel predictions based on theoretical hypotheses that do not seem to be retained, not even approximately, by posterior theories. Here, though, we confine our work just to the detailed reconstruction of what we take to be the main novel, successful Ptolemaic predictions, leaving the full analysis and assessment of their significance for the realist thesis to future works.

Section snippets

Introduction: selective scientific realism as a meta-empirical, testable thesis

Scientific realism (SR) about unobservables claims that the non-observational content of our successful/justified empirical theories is true, or approximately true. As is well known, the argument that is currently considered the best in favor of SR is a kind of abduction or inference to the best explanation, dubbed the No Miracles Argument (NMA). NMA states that the predictive success of a theory that makes (novel) observational predictions while making use of non-observational content/posits

Venus and Mercury, and only they, produce transits1

The successful and novel prediction involved in this first case asserts that Mars, Jupiter and Saturn are always beyond the Sun (i.e. they are the “outer planets”). This does not mean that you would never find any outer planet closer to the Earth than the Sun. That is also implied by Ptolemy's theory but it is not true; during retrograde motion, Mars is closer to the Earth than the Sun. It means that whenever Mars, Jupiter or Saturn are in conjunction with the Sun, they are beyond the Sun. This

Outer planets are never eclipsed by the Earth's shadow

In this brief section we will present other successful novel prediction that follows from the same set of theoretical claims that implies the prediction of Section 2. Therefore, it could be understood as a kind of corollary of the previous section. As we noted above, a lunar eclipse is produced when the Earth passes between the Sun and the Moon and therefore the Earth's shadow obscures the Moon; in Fig. 1, Fig. 2 (right) the Moon (C) is eclipsed because it is inside the Earth's shadow cone. For

The changing phases of outer planets

It is well known that, contrary to Heliocentrism and Brahe's Geocentrism, Ptolemy's Geocentrism wrongly predicts that Venus does not show strong change in phases. The story is somewhat more complicated though, for although it is true that Ptolemy's system was not capable of predicting some of Venus's phases, it is also true that it does correctly predict other phases of the inner planets and all the phases of the outer ones. In particular, what constitutes a novel prediction is the fact that

The increasing brightness during the retrograde motion for Mars

It is usually claimed that the main reason for the rejection of Eudoxus' homocentric spheres in favor of the epicycle and deferent system was that the former cannot explain the patent increase in planetary brightness during retrograde motion. If the brightness of the source is taken as constant and variation in brightness depends only on distance, then an increase in brightness is obviously interpreted as the planet approaching the Earth. In the Eudoxian proposal, all the spheres are centered

Some objections

Ancient geocentric astronomy has generally been ignored in the ongoing scientific realism debate. We have argued here that Ptolemaic astronomy presents at least four predictions that are both successful and novel, in the sense that the theory was not designed to accommodate them, thus qualifying them as cases that deserve attention in the SR debate. Moreover, the fact that in these cases there seems to be almost nothing preserved at the theoretical level by the superseding heliocentric theory

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    Research for this work has been funded by the research projects FFI2012-37354/CONSOLIDER INGENIO CSD2009-0056 (Spain), and PICT2010 No. 319 (ANPCyT, Argentina)/PIP No. 114-201101-00112 (CONICET, Argentina). We want to thank L. Laudan, S. French, B. van Fraassen and two anonimous referees for comments and criticisms to previous versions of this paper.

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