Abstract
Ian Maitland defends sweatshop labor on the grounds that “A wage or labor practice is ethically acceptable if it is freely chosen by informed workers” (he calls his view “the Classical Liberal Standard,” CLS). I present several examples of economic exchanges that are mutually beneficial and satisfy the requirements of the CLS, but, nonetheless, are morally wrong. Maitland’s arguments in defense of sweatshops are unsuccessful because they depend on the flawed “CLS.” My paper criticizes Maitland’s arguments in defense of sweatshops, but I do not claim that his conclusions are false—I do not claim to have shown that the labor practices Maitland defends are morally wrong. I argue that some of the disagreements about sweatshops between Maitland and his critics depend on disagreements about the answers controversial questions in ethical theory. In the absence of definitive answers to those questions, there are no decisive arguments for or against Maitland’s view about sweatshops.
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Notes
Maitland (2004), p. 582. Maitland’s paper was first published in The British Academy of Management Annual Conference Proceedings, September 1997, pp. 240–265. It has been reprinted in Ethics at Work: Basic Readings in Business Ethics, William H. Shaw, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Case Studies in Business Ethics, Al Gini, ed., fifth edition (Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 2004; Moral Issues in Business, William H. Shaw and Vincent Barry, eds., 9th edn. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2006); Moral Issues in Business, William H. Shaw and Vincent Barry, eds., 10th edn. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2006); William Shaw, Social and Personal Ethics, Fifth edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2005); William Shaw, Social and Personal Ethics, Sixth edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2008); Ethical Theory and Business, 6th edn Tom Beauchamp and Norman Bowie (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2001); and Ethical Theory and Business, 8th edn Tom Beauchamp, Norman Bowie, and Dennis Arnold (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2008). All page numbers cited here refer to the version of the paper in the 7th edition of Beauchamp and Bowie Ethical Theory and Business (Maitland 2004).
(Maitland, 2004), p. 581.
(Maitland, 2004), p. 582.
In this respect, Maitland's CLS is arguably more demanding than Friedman's theory about the social responsibilities of business. Friedman's theory does not always require employers to inform their employees about serious workplace hazards; on this point, see Carson (1993).
Friedman (1963, p. 13).
Friedman (1963, p. 15). Friedman seems to contradict this in his discussion of monopolies. He says that exchanges between monopolistic businesses and their customers are not free/voluntary exchanges. When monopolies exist consumers are not coerced, but their options are severely limited. Friedman writes:
Exchange is truly voluntary only when nearly equivalent alternatives exist. Monopoly implies the absence of alternatives and thereby inhibits effective freedom of exchange (Friedman 1963, p. 28).
Here, Friedman seems to agree with proponents of “positive liberty” that absence of alternatives is a limitation on one's freedom. It is unclear how much significance Friedman attaches to the distinction between being coerced and having “effective freedom.” Unfortunately, he never speaks directly to this matter in Capitalism and Freedom.
Some libertarians would add that being the victim of fraud can also limit one’s freedom. On this issue, see Child (1994).
None of this is intended as a criticism of Maitland. I am simply pointing out a clear but unstated assumption of his argument.
Maitland (2004, p. 585).
Maitland (2004, p. 585).
Here, I will ignore the following complication. Sometimes, individuals choose to work in ways that sacrifice their own self-interests for the sake of others, e.g., a man who ruins his health working in a coal mine for the sake of his children's education or for the sake of giving money to charity.
See Feinberg (1990, p. 232). Feinberg gives the example of someone who charges $100 for a glass of water to someone in danger of dying of thirst.
Private correspondence.
The universalizability principle says that if one makes a moral judgment about a particular case, then one must make the same moral judgment about any similar case, unless there is a morally relevant difference between the cases.
Alternatively, suppose that two of the people present are willing to help, but we both insist on a substantial payment as a condition of rendering help.
Scanlon distinguishes between what he calls “The Rescue Principle” and the broader “principle of Helpfulness” which requires that we benefit others when we can easily do so. He claims that the Rescue Principle is stronger than the principle of Helpfulness in that: 1. it can require a higher level of sacrifice for others, and 2. it takes precedence in case of conflict (Scanlon 1998, pp. 229–230). Scanlon would presumably agree with Maitland that the distinction between temporary emergencies and chronic problems is morally relevant. But it would be far beyond the scope of this paper for me explain these principles and Scanlon’s arguments for what he says about them, much less assess his arguments.
R. M. Hare proposes a method for determining when differences between cases are and are not morally relevant. See Hare (1963, pp. 106–107, 1981, pp. 62–64); also see Carson (2010, Chap. 6).
For a further development of this sort of argument, see Maitland (2002, p. 460).
Ross (1930, pp. 21–23).
Sweatshop workers may also have special duties of gratitude to their employers.
For a further development of this sort of argument, see Maitland (2002, p. 460).
A very digressive and speculative footnote. I think that we should take seriously the possibility that both Maitland’s view and the contrary view sketched here are reasonable views and that there are no decisive reasons to endorse one over the other. We should take seriously a form of moral relativism according to which there are objectively correct answers to some, but not all, moral questions. Here is an argument for this version of moral relativism:
1. A moral judgment is objectively true if, and only if, all ideally rational morally judges would accept it.
2. Ideally rational moral judges would agree in their answers to some, but not all, moral questions.
Therefore,
3. There are objectively true answers to some, but not all, moral questions.
For statements of this argument see Carson (1984, Chap. 2); Carson 1989); and Brandt (1959, Chaps. 10, 11). Chapters 7 and 8 of (Carson 2000) endorse a very similar argument on the assumption that a loving God does not exist. For a defense of this sort of moderate moral relativism on different grounds, see Chaps. 6 and 7 of Carson (2010), Foot (2001), and Brandt (2001).
The view that there are no objectively correct answers to certain moral questions does not commit one to an “anything goes” version of relativism according to which any answers to those questions are as good as any other answers. To see this, we can point to Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of the objectivity of theories of justice. Nussbaum says that very likely there is more than one plausible conception of the virtue of justice and no single theory of justice that is more plausible than any other. But [Nussbaum continues]:
The Aristotelian position that I wish to defend need not insist in every case, on a single answer to the request for a specification of virtue. The answer might turn out to be a disjunction. The process of comparative and critical debate will, I imagine, eliminate numerous contenders—for example, the view of justice that prevailed in Cyme [my note: Aristotle criticized the laws regarding murder in Cyme because they included the following provision: “If the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsman, the accused shall be held guilty,” (Aristotle, Politics 1268b40)]. But what remains might be called a plurality of acceptable accounts. Success in the eliminative task will still be no trivial accomplishment. Nussbaum (2001, pp. 211–212).
Nussbaum is at pains to insist that this is not an “anything goes” view according to which all moral judgments are equally valid. Nor does her view commit her to saying that “the whole idea of searching for the truth is an old fashioned error.” She says, “Certain ways in which people see the world can still be criticized exactly as Aristotle criticized them: as stupid, pernicious and false,” Nussbaum (2001, p. 216).
Is there a rationale for preferring the RCLS to the CLS other than its ability to avoid the objections constituted by my three cases? One possible rationale is this: it not right to bargain aggressively and self-interestedly with someone whose options are so severely constrained that she lacks any “live options”—any options other than death. When people lack even minimal “effective freedom,” they are so vulnerable that it is morally impermissible for people who are not similarly vulnerable to try to take advantage of their vulnerability in market transactions. This seems close in spirit to the views of those who denounce sweatshops on the account of the exploitation they involve and, to that extent, I doubt very much that Maitland would accept it. I hope that my RCLS and these speculations will provoke a response from Maitland.
Maitland (2004, p. 587).
Maitland (2004, p. 587).
To see this, imagine that within every country in the world, incomes are completely equal. This is compatible with the existence of massive economic inequalities if the average incomes of different nations are very different. (It is compatible with its being the case that some very large groups of people have incomes hundreds of times larger than other very large groups of people.) I offer no general account of the difficult and ambiguous notion of economic equality. My arguments here are only intended to show that there are economic inequalities other than those which exist within individual nations.
Maitland (2004, p. 587).
Maitland (2004, p. 588).
Maitland (2004, p. 589).
Partial evidence for this can be found in Connor (2001). Connor quotes from a Nike web site that breaks down the costs of its production. According to Nike, the total labor cost of a shoe that sells for $65 is $2.43. It would seem that Nike could dramatically increase the wages it pays to its workers without greatly increasing the price of its products. It could double the wages it pays its sweatshop workers by raising the price of the shoes from $65 to $67.43.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the reviewer who made many helpful comments. I have used some of her/his ideas and suggestions in part III. Thanks also to Alexei Marcoux, Ian Maitland, David Schweickart, Gillian Crozier, Nora Carson, Judith Carson, Mark Chakoian, and Joe Mendola for very helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. Parts of this paper are based on my commentary on Maitland’s paper at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division April 2000. I presented an earlier version of the paper at the Eleventh Annual International Business Ethics Conference, De Paul University, October 2004.
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Carson, T.L. Free Exchange for Mutual Benefit: Sweatshops and Maitland’s “Classical Liberal Standard”. J Bus Ethics 112, 127–135 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1236-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1236-3