Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to work toward an explicit logic and semantics for a game theoretically inspired theory of action. The purpose of the logic is to explicate the conceptual machinery implicit in the dialogue-game model of rational discourse developed in Carlson (1983).
A variety of ideas and techniques of modal and philosophical logic are used to define a model structure that generalizes the game theoretical notion of a game in extensive form (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Relative to this model structure, semantic characterizations are given to the action-theoretic notions oftime, possibility, belief, preference, ability, intention, action, andrationality. The unification of these characterizations under the game-theoretical paradigm leads to insights about the logical interdependences between these concepts.
The resulting theory of rational interaction is applied to the explication of rational dialogue. The main benefit of the enterprise for a theory of rational dialogue is that concepts and results of game theory become accessible to the explication of dialogue. In particular, the task of proving the logical coherence of a discourse is reduced to the task of showing the rationality of strategy choices made in an associated dialogue game.
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Carlson, L. Logic for dialogue games. Synthese 99, 377–415 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063995
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063995