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Notes
W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,”Philosophical Review, 60:20–43 (1951); see especially pp. 23f.
This paper presupposes the explication of logical truth, which will be indicated in §2, and that of the distinction between logical and descriptive constants (compareIntroduction to Semantics, §13). Our present task is only to solve the additional problem involved in the explication of analyticity.
The great difficulties and complications of any attempt to explicate logical concepts for natural languages have been clearly explained by Benson Mates in “Analytic Sentences,”Philosophical Review, 60:525–34 (1951), and Richard Martin, “On ‘Analytic’,”Philosophical Studies, 3:42–47 (1952). Both articles offer strong arguments against the view held by Quine and Morton G. White that there is no clear distinction between analytic and synthetic (Quine, op. cit.; White, “The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism,” inJohn Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, 1952).
CompareLogical Syntax of Language, §34c.
See, for example, J. Cooley,Primer of Formal Logic (1942), p. 153.
The term ‘L-true with respect toP’ is simply a special case of the relative L-terms which I have used elsewhere: seeLogical Foundations of Probability (1950), D20-2.
J. G. Kemeny, review ofLogical Foundations of Probability in Journal of Symbolic Logic, 16:205–7 (1951).
Y. Bar-Hillel, “A Note on State-Descriptions,”Philosophical Studies, 2:72–75 (1951). Compare my reply, “The Problem of Relations in Inductive Logic,”ibid., 75–80.
Some possibilities of this are outlined in my paper mentioned in the preceding footnote.
See footnote 7. The procedure was carried out by Kemeny in “Extension of the Methods of Inductive Logic,”Philosophical Studies, 3:38–42 (1952) and in the forthcoming paper “A Logical Measure Function,” to appear injournal of Symbolic Logic. (These two articles were not known to me when I wrote the present paper.)
See Bar-Hillel, op. cit., p. 74, “the third possibility.”
“Testability and Meaning,”Philosophy of Science, vols. 3 and 4 (1936 and 1937); reprinted by Graduate Philosophy Club, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 1950; see §§8–10.
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editors' note. In printing this paper, it has been necessary to to substitute boldface type for the German Gothic which Professor Carnap uses for metalinguistic sympols.
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Carnap, R. Meaning postulates. Philos Stud 3, 65–73 (1952). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02350366
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02350366