Abstract
Some forms of analytic reconstructivism take natural language (and common sense at large) to be ontologically opaque: ordinary sentences must be suitably rewritten or paraphrased before questions of ontological commitment may be raised. Other forms of reconstructivism take the commitment of ordinary language at face value, but regard it as metaphysically misleading: common-sense objects exist, but they are not what we normally think they are. This paper is an attempt to clarify and critically assess some common limits of these two reconstructivist strategies.
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Carrara, M., Varzi, A.C. Ontological Commitment And Reconstructivism. Erkenntnis 55, 33–50 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011983620221
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011983620221