Abstract
This article presents a conceptual discussion on the phenomenon of incorporation of tools and other objects in the light of Maine de Biran’s philosophy of the relation between the body and the motor will. Drawing on Maine de Biran’s view of the body as that portion of the material world which directly obeys one’s motor will, as well as on his view (supported by studies in contemporary cognitive science) of active touch as the perceptual modality that is sensitive to objects as fields of forces resisting the perceiver’s movements, we discuss the phenomena of motor incorporation and haptic incorporation, as well as the relation between them. Motor incorporation occurs when something is integrated into the motor system, i.e. when practice enables one to animate an object as directly, effortlessly and fluently as one is able to animate one’s own body. The subject then has the experience of acting there, where the object is located, not at the body–object interface. In order to better understand the phenomenon of motor incorporation, we highlight the phenomenological difference between directly and indirectly moving something. Haptic incorporation occurs when something is integrated into the haptic system, i.e. when an object is used as an instrument for the haptic perception of other objects. Finally, we seek to shed light on the phenomenon of transparency, understanding the transparency acquired by the incorporated object as both a relational property and a matter of degrees.
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Notes
We will not focus on the details of Biran’s philosophy of will, effort, and the body. Rather, we will mention only that which is relevant for the present article. Our exposition is therefore incomplete, but it serves our purposes. For a more detailed (though concise) exposition of Biran’s ideas, see Declerck (2005). The present article draws extensively, though not exclusively, on Declerck’s exposition.
Our translation. The original reads: “Si le corps propre n’etait pas (…) soumis à la force une du vouloir moteur, il est impossible de concevoir qu’il pût y avoir quelque chose de représenté ou de conçu hors du moi sous une forme d’étendue exterieure ou de corps étranger; de même, ou par suite, s’il n’y avait pas une certaine inertie ou résistance à l’effort locomoteur (…), il est impossible de concevoir comment le moi de l’homme, confondu avec son corps, (…) pourrait-il percevoir d’autres existences étrangères ou séparées de la sienne”.
Our translation. The original reads:“le pilote fait avancer son vaisseau, mais il n'en sent pas les mouvements”.
Though see Declerck (2005), who, writing in biranian terms, views the blind man’s stick as an extension of the body inasmuch as it extends beyond the limits of the body the effort produced by that very body.
It should be noted that, in Clark’s view, fluency and direct animation are not sufficient for us to declare objects as having been incorporated. Rather, he seems to hold that the major evidence for this comes from neuroscience, more specifically from studies showing that, following a certain amount of practice with a tool, parietal and putaminal bimodal neurons may expand their visual receptive fields (usually limited, e.g. to the space next to the hands) so as to include the space occupied by the tool. A review of these findings can be found in Maravita and Iriki (2004).
Gapenne (2010) suggests that other perceptual modalities are also sensitive to resistance to movement, in a related sense. For instance, in vision, the shape of an object (say, a large building) constrains the way I must explore it in order to adequately perceive it. Gapenne calls this “quasi resistance”, indicating that, while it is not literal, physical resistance, it is still the case that the object is constraining my exploratory movements in a specific way.
Our translation. The original reads: “l’intérieur du sujet se sépare comme tout ce qui se déplace avec son point de vue (son point d’action) et son extérieur est défini comme tout ce par rapport à quoi il se déplace. …Le stylo que je tiens fermement en main (qui ne bouge pas relativement à moi) est “intérieur” et transforme les possibilités d’agir et de sentir de mon corps propre. La feuille sur laquelle je laisse une trace est “extérieure” puisque mon point d’action (la pointe du stylo) ou mon point de vue se déplace relativement à elle”.
We should note, though, that incorporation of the rubber hand is inseparable from it being experienced by the subject as a part of his own perceptual system (namely, that of passive touch).
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Acknowledgements
FC was supported by a grant by CAPES, Brazil (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior). MCA was supported by a grant by FAPERJ, Brazil (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro). VK was supported by a research grant by CNPq, Brazil (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico). The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful remarks.
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Carijó, F.H., de Almeida, M.C. & Kastrup, V. On haptic and motor incorporation of tools and other objects. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 685–701 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9269-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9269-8