Abstract
Standard definitions of lying imply that intending to deceive others is a necessary condition of one's telling a lie. In an earlier paper, which appeared in this journal, Wokutch, Murrmann and I argued that intending to deceive others is not a necessary condition of one's telling a lie and proposed an alternative definition. In a reply which also appeared in this journal, Gary Jones argues that (1) our arguments fail to establish the claim that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive others, and that (2) the objections which we raise for standard definitions apply equally to our own. The present paper argues that one can lie without intending to deceive others. I concede Jones' second criticism and propose a new alternative definition.
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Thomas L. Carson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. He was awarded the NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. He is the author of The Status of Morality (D. Reidel, Philosophical Studies Series, 1984), and he has written numerous articles concerning both ethical theory and applied ethics.
I am indebted to Harry Gensler for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Carson, T.L. On the definition of lying: A reply to Jones and revisions. J Bus Ethics 7, 509–514 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382597
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382597