The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness.
Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 01 January 2007
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