Abstract
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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Notes
Hans Muller, “Why Qualia Are Not Epiphenomenal,” Ratio, 21 2008, p. 88.
Ibid.
See Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, 32 p. 133.
Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” p. 133. Emphasis in original.
References
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136. doi:10.2307/2960077.
Muller, H. (2008). Why qualia are not epiphenomenal. Ratio, 21(1), 85–90.
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49(3), 329–359. doi:10.1007/BF00355521.
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Cavedon-Taylor, D. Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37, 105–107 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9152-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9152-6