Abstract
Under the influence of naturalistic approaches, contemporary philosophy of science tends to characterize scientific objectivity not by virtue of the individualistic following of rules or satisfying epistemic utilities, but as a property arising from the organisational features of groups. This paper presents a critical review of one such proposal, that of Helen Longino, probing some of its main features against the debate between Pasteur and Pouchet in mid-nineteenth-century France regarding the spontaneous generation of life. After considering some weaknesses and strengths, it is argued that Longino’s social epistemology is only able to generate normativity by implicitly assuming a classic procedural notion of epistemic acceptability. The paper also aims to use this historical case to shed light on the complex, multidimensional nature of the dynamics of actual science, arguing both against purely epistemic and exclusively social approaches in a satisfactory meta-scientific explanation of controversies.
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Notes
While recognizing this analytical tradition as the inherited view on the matter, one must bear in mind the trial to reinterpret individualistic procedures application or rule following in a social manner, following the lead of Wittgenstein (1953) by well-known STS scholars such as Bloor (1983). As to a review of social epistemologies versus traditional individually-centered approaches to scientific knowledge, see Longino (2002a, Ch. 3).
It must be noted that Longino generally avoids using the label “naturalism” for her approach. The reason is that, contrarily to e.g., Giere (2000) or Laudan (1990), she believes that naturalism excludes normativity. She, notwithstanding, assumes her approach as a naturalist one in the sense that “it treats the conditions of knowledge production by human cognitive agents, empirical rather than transcendental subjects, as the starting point for any philosophical theory of knowledge, scientific or otherwise” (2002a: 10). In terms of the above classification inspired in Haack (1993, Ch. 6), Longino’s social epistemology can be understood as a modest naturalistic approach, i.e., an expansionist approach in philosophical naturalism which, in principle, makes room for normativity (Fagan 2010).
A clarification is needed in relation to the dichotomy rational-social in this approach. This presentation tries to reflect faithfully Longino’s approach but necessarily includes some degree of interpretation. Longino’s philosophy of science is not the closed and perfectly coherent system one would expect to find in her writings. Longino’s philosophy is an evolving one where it is possible to find some ambiguous claims and conflicting ideas. For instance, even if she often claims that the distinction between the rational and the social has to be left behind (particularly in 2002a, as, e.g., in pp. 2, 8, etc.) when reflecting about the general methodological framework for philosophical analysis, she also assumes such a distinction in other parts of her work. In fact, throughout (1990) she differentiates between scientific inquiry and sociocultural values, guiding-questions (e.g., 1990, 48, 65–66), general argument (see 1990, Ch. 10) and case studies (e.g., 1990, 86ff.) as basis for defending a tight interaction between them and the thesis that science is necessarily social. In general, while in (1990) “rational” and “social” are presented as different although interacting attributes, in (2002a, e.g., Ch. 4) the dichotomy is explicitly rejected along with the defense of effective integration. In any case, in my view, Longino must assume that constitutive and contextual values belong to different categories, as precondition for asserting “the interaction of internal and external factors in the development of inquiry” (1990, 6), that Kuhnian theoretical virtues are socio-culturally laden (1995, 396), or when analyzing objectivity in terms of the management of social values permeating evidential relations (2002a, 50). See also Lacey (1999, 212–218).
Actually, Longino distinguishes between “objectivity as a characteristic of scientific method and objectivity as a characteristic of individual scientific practitioners” (1990, 66), so as to defend scientific objectivity as a consequence of scientific inquiry’s being social. Her approach thus tries to specify a contextual view of objectivity in procedural terms of a social nature (1990, Ch. 4). See, notwithstanding, Kitcher (2002, 553) as well as Longino (2002b, 574–575; 2008, 241–242) and Wray (1999, S449–s450).
“Satisfaction of these norms assures that theories and hypotheses accepted in the community will not incorporate the idiosyncratic biases (heuristic or social) of an individual or subgroup” (2002a, 134). Here and elsewhere (e.g., 2002a, 173) Longino defends that objectivity is a social attribute explicated by the fulfilling of these type of social norms, even though in more programmatic parts of her work she announces that social norms must be supplemented with norms applying to practices of individuals in order to provide a satisfactory account of epistemic acceptability (2002a, 8–9). Perhaps two remarks by Longino might clarify this tension: firstly, she says that “social” must not be understood as “collective” or “shared” but as “interactive” (that is, recursively construed upon individuals) (2002a, 99, 148), and, secondly, she explicitly embraces an interpretation of nonindividualism which she terms as “socialist” (vs. wholist and eliminativist interpretations) where it is not the group qua group who knows nor knowledge is a detached product of collective practices, it is rather the differences and commonalities between individuals in interaction what enables them together to generate and justify theories and hypotheses (2002a, 90–91). At any event, Longino assumes scientific objectivity as a social attribute depending on, and explicated by, organizational properties of scientific communities (see above).
Note, however, that Pasteur also embraced a metaphysics expressed through his idées préconçues, especially his belief in a cosmic asymmetry responsible for life. See, e.g., his “Mémoire sur la fermentation de l'acide tartrique of 1858” (in Pasteur 1922–1939, vol. 2, 28).
The use of Solomon’s terminology here, or Lakatos’s later on, must not be seen as adopting an alternative philosophical outlook in order to confront it with that of Longino’s, but as a mere critical tool which may prove useful in order to throw light on the dynamics of the controversy.
While Longino does not explicitly equal “debate closure” with “consensus”, and avoids in general the reference to consensus, she presents consensus as the final point of discursive interactions (1990, 79; 2002a, 134) and differentiates between legitimate and illegitimate consensus in virtue of fulfilling the four conditions of critical scrutiny (2002a, 131).
See Rescher (1993, 13), who makes a similar critical point in relation to the consensus theory of J. Habermas.
“If concepts like ‘truth’, ‘correctness’, ‘rationality’, and the like are construed with reference to the situation of an ideal (perfected, completed) community, then they wear their normative character in their sleeves” (Rescher 1993, 27, 53ff.).
Let us note that, up to now, the issue of objectivity is independent from the individualism vs. nonindividualism dichotomy.
Longino also asserts that those classical criteria can have variations in different contexts and are also rendered to critical scrutiny, although the practical success of our beliefs demands a “regard for logic and for the evidence of sensory experience” (2002a, 162).
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Research projects FFI2014-58269 of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, and GRUPIN14-0128 of the FICYT Agency of the Asturias Government, provided support for the elaboration of this paper.
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López Cerezo, J.A. Social Objectivity Under Scrutiny in the Pasteur–Pouchet Debate. J Gen Philos Sci 46, 301–318 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9294-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9294-8