Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. A survey of the history of theories of verisimilitude is provided by Niiniluoto (1998). See also Oddie (2008) and, for a technical comparison of the main positions, Zwart (2001). For an introduction to VS in the context of a general discussion of different theories of scientific progress see Niiniluoto (2011a). Kuipers’ and Niiniluoto’s contributions to VS are discussed at length, respectively, in Festa et al. (2005a, b) and in Pihlström et al. (2007).

  2. Disagreements can be recorded both on the level of the definition of the notion of verisimilitude (cf. Niiniluoto 1998 and Zwart 2001) and on the more general level of the methodological significance of this concept (see for instance Kieseppä 1996a and Zamora Bonilla 1992, 1996, 2000).

  3. Rowbottom, however, seems to be one of them. In his rejoinder to Bird, he explicitly endorses (a qualified version of) S, according to which ‘science makes progress by discovering new truths’ and ‘excluding falsehoods’ (2010, p. 245). In any case, Rowbottom clearly distinguishes S and VS as different accounts of progress—a distinction that, on the contrary, Bird completely overlooks.

  4. To continue the example above, if (p 1 & … & p n ) is ‘the truth’, then (p 1 & p 2), being logically stronger, is also more verisimilar than (p 1). However, it should be noted that, according to Oddie (1986), logically stronger true theories are not necessarily more verisimilar than weaker ones.

  5. See, e.g., Niiniluoto (1987, p. 263) and (1998, p. 20); Zwart (2001, pp. 4–5, 121); Festa (2007, p. 96).

  6. For a detailed discussion and comparison of such methods, see Niiniluoto (1987, Chap. 6), where his favorite min-sum measure is defended as the most adequate measure of verisimilitude (cf. also Niiniluoto 1999b, Sect. 3.5).

  7. Of course, the HD-evaluation of the empirical merits of theories is complicated by a number of well-known factors, such as, for instance, the fact that the derivation of predictions from a theory requires the use of auxiliary hypotheses (2000, pp. 107–110).

  8. For detailed case studies of progress as increasing verisimilitude see Niiniluoto (1994); Cools et al. (1994); Hettema and Kuipers (1995); Kieseppä (1996b, Chap. 7); Votsis and Schurz (2011).

  9. According to Bird, ‘whether one prefers to couch [such an argument] in terms of accumulating truth or increasing verisimilitude is immaterial’ (2007, pp. 65–66); however, as we argue, the view of progress as increasing verisimilitude eschews Bird’s criticism.

  10. Notice that, although Bird discusses sequences of true (or increasingly verisimilar) beliefs, his example is aimed at undermining S also when the case of only one true (or increasingly verisimilar) belief lacking appropriate grounding in the evidence is taken into account.

  11. For this distinction, see in particular Hilpinen (1976); Niiniluoto (1987, pp. 176–177 and 218–219; 1998, p. 18; 1999a, pp. 72–73); Weston (1992, pp. 54–56 and Sect. 10).

  12. In this paper, we limited ourselves to a defence of VS against the criticisms raised by Bird. Nevertheless, it seems worth mentioning that Bird’s epistemic account of progress, which views progress as the accumulation of knowledge, suffers from a number of problems that VS eschews quite naturally. For instance, as forcefully argued by Rowbottom (2010), since an increase in knowledge requires an increase in true beliefs, it is difficult to see how the epistemic approach can account for progress in cases, such as the transition from Kepler’s to Newton’s theory, in which false theories replace false theories. On this, see also Niiniluoto (2011a, Sect. 3.5).

  13. On the problem of truth approximation through belief change, see especially Niiniluoto (1999b, 2010, 2011b); Cevolani and Calandra (2010); Kuipers (2011a, b); Schurz (2011); Cevolani et al. (2011).

References

  • Bird, A. (2007). What is scientific progress? Noûs, 41, 64–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bird, A. (2008). Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge. A reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39, 279–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cevolani, G. & Calandra, F. (2010). Approaching the truth via belief change in propositional languages. In M. Suárez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (Eds.), EPSA. Epistemology and methodology of science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association (pp. 47–62). Berlin: Springer.

  • Cevolani, G., Crupi, V., & Festa, R. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories. Erkenntnis, 75, 183–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cools, K., Hamminga, B., & Kuipers, Th. A. F. (1994). Truth approximation by concretization in capital structure theory. In B. Hamminga & N. De Marchi (Eds.), Idealization VI: Idealization in economics (pp. 205–228). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Dilworth, C. (2008). Scientific progress. A study concerning the nature of the relation between successive scientific theories (4th ed.). Berlin/New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Festa, R. (2007). Verisimilitude, cross classification, and prediction logic. Approaching the statistical truth by falsified qualitative theories. Mind and Society, 6, 91–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Festa, R., Aliseda, A., & Peijnenburg, J. (Eds.) (2005b). Cognitive structures in scientific inquiry. Essays in debate with Theo Kuipers. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.

  • Festa, R., Aliseda, A., & Peijnenburg, J. (Eds.) (2005a). Confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation. Essays in debate with Theo Kuipers. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.

  • Hettema, H. & Kuipers, Th. A. F. (1995). Sommerfeld’s Atombau: a case study in potential truth approximation. In Th. A. F. Kuipers & A. R. Mackor (Eds.), Cognitive patterns in science and common sense (pp. 273–197). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Hilpinen, R. (1976). Approximate truth and truthlikeness. In M. Przełecki, K. Szaniawski & R. Wójcicki (Eds.), Formal methods in the methodology of the empirical sciences (pp. 19–42). Dordrecht: Reidel.

  • Kieseppä, I. A. (1996a). On the aim of the theory of verisimilitude. Synthese, 107, 421–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kieseppä, I. A. (1996b). Truthlikeness for multidimensional, quantitative cognitive problems. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, Th. S. (1962/1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (1987). A structuralist approach to truthlikeness. In Th. A. F. Kuipers (Ed.), What is closer-to-the-truth? (pp. 79–99). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (2004). Inference to the best theory, rather than inference to the best explanation. Kinds of abduction and induction. In F. Stadler (Ed.), Induction and deduction in the sciences (pp. 25–51). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (2009). Comparative realism as the best response to antirealism. In C. Glymour, W. Wei & D. Westerstahl (Eds.), Logic, methodology and philosophy of science. Proceedings of the thirteenth international congress (August 9–15, 2007, Beijing) (pp. 221–250). London: College Publications.

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (2011a). Basic and refined nomic truth approximation by evidence-guided belief revision in AGM-terms. Erkenntnis, 75, 223–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, Th. A. F. (2011b). Dovetailing belief base revision with (basic) truth approximation. Forthcoming in the proceedings of the Logic, reasoning and rationality conference (Gent, September 20–22, 2010).

  • Laudan, L. (1978). Progress and its problems. Towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley: The University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1984). Science and values. Berkeley: The University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1996). Beyond positivism and relativism. Theory, method, and evidence. Boulder: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liu, C. (1999). Approximation, idealization, and laws of nature. Synthese, 118, 229–256.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, C. (2004). Laws and models in a theory of idealization. Synthese, 138, 363–385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Losee, J. (2004). Theories of scientific progress. An introduction. London/New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. (1974). Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 166–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. (1978). On distance from the truth as a true distance. In J. Hintikka, I. Niiniluoto & E. Saarinen (Eds.), Essays on mathematical and philosophical logic (pp. 415–435). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1984). Is science progressive?. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1994). Approximation in applied science. In M. Kuokkanen (Ed.), Idealization VII: Structuralism, idealization, and approximation (pp. 127–139). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1998). Verisimilitude: the third period. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, 1–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1999a). Critical scientific realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1999b). Belief revision and truthlikeness. In B. Hansson, S. Halldén, N.-E. Sahlin & W. Rabinowicz (Eds.), Spinning ideas: Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors, http://www.lucs.lu.se/spinning/. Accessed 1 Dec 2011.

  • Niiniluoto, I. (2010). Theory change, truthlikeness, and belief revision. In M. Suárez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (Eds.), EPSA. Epistemology and methodology of science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association (pp. 189–199). Berlin: Springer.

  • Niiniluoto, I. (2011a). Scientific progress. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2011 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/scientificprogress/. Accessed 1 Dec 2011.

  • Niiniluoto, I. (2011b). Revising beliefs towards the truth. Erkenntnis, 75, 165–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Northcott, R. (2011). Verisimilitude: a causal approach. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9895-7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, G. (1986). Likeness to truth. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, G. (2008). Truthlikeness. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truthlikeness/. Accessed 1 Dec 2011.

  • Pihlström, S., Raatikainen, P., & Sintonen, M. (Eds.). (2007). Approaching truth: Essays in honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piscopo, C., & Birattari, M. (2010). A critique of the constitutive role of truthlikeness in the similarity approach. Erkenntnis, 72, 379–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge. An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowbottom, D. P. (2008). N-rays and the semantic view of scientific progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39, 277–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowbottom, D. P. (2010). What scientific progress is not: against Bird’s epistemic view. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 24, 241–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief revision. With a focus on the relevant element account. Erkenntnis, 75, 203–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (1987). Verisimilitude defined by relevant consequence-elements. A new reconstruction of Popper’s original idea. In Th. A. F. Kuipers (Ed.), What is closer-to-the-truth? (pp. 47–78). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

  • Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (2010). Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude. Synthese, 172, 415–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tichý, P. (1974). On Popper’s definition of verisimilitude. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 155–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Votsis, I., & Schurz, G. (2011). A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weston, T. (1992). Approximate truth and scientific realism. Philosophy of Science, 59, 53–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora Bonilla, J. (1992). Truthlikeness without truth: a methodological approach. Synthese, 93, 343–372.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora Bonilla, J. (1996). Verisimilitude, structuralism, and scientific progress. Erkenntnis, 44, 25–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora Bonilla, J. (2000). Truthlikeness, rationality, and scientific method. Synthese, 122, 321–335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zwart, S. D. (2001). Refined verisimilitude. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Roberto Festa, Theo Kuipers, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Gustavo Cevolani acknowledges financial support from PRIN grant 2008 ‘Probability, stability, and invariance’. Luca Tambolo acknowledges financial support from PRIN grant 2008 ‘Probability, confirmation, and verisimilitude. The cognitive structures of “expert” opinion and decision in the empirical sciences and social interactions’.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna, Piazza Sassatelli 26, 41057, Spilamberto, Modena, Italy

    Gustavo Cevolani

  2. Department of Philosophy, Languages, and Literatures, University of Trieste, Via Ponte Albano, 51, 40037, Sasso Marconi, Bologna, Italy

    Luca Tambolo

Authors
  1. Gustavo Cevolani
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Luca Tambolo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gustavo Cevolani.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Cevolani, G., Tambolo, L. Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach. Erkenn 78, 921–935 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9362-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9362-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation