Abstract
Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.
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Notes
Reflecting the empiricist bent of influential antirealisms, ‘unobservable’ here is traditionally applied to anything that cannot be detected by the unaided senses. Stanford (2006, p. 12) prefers to speak of an ‘inaccessible domain of nature,’ which includes items too small to be seen unaided, but also items that are spatially or temporally distant, rare, or otherwise hard to investigate. The difference is substantive, but will play no material role in the discussion here.
Like some in the literature, Stanford reserves the term ‘empirical equivalence’ for theories that are equivalent with respect to all possible evidence, whereas I (and others) also apply it to theories that are equivalent merely with respect to the available evidence, noting the difference. Following Sklar (1975), Stanford uses the term ‘transient underdetermination’ in connection with the latter case, but I dislike this usage, for when theories are empirically equivalent with respect to the available but not all possible evidence, there is no guarantee that (the putative problem of) underdetermination is transient, since there is no guarantee that differentiating evidence will always be obtainable, and if it is, that it will be obtained.
A sketch is all I can provide here, but for an elaboration, see Chakravartty (2007, Part I).
See Hardin and Rosenberg (1982), for example.
References
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Arthur Fine, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Sherri Roush, and an excellent audience for a great session, and especially Kyle for the invitation, and his thoughtful and spirited replies.
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Presented at a symposium on P. Kyle Stanford’s Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, at the Pacific Division APA meeting in San Francisco, 2007.
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Chakravartty, A. What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived. Philos Stud 137, 149–158 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9173-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9173-1