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Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players

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Abstract

A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expected utility players. It is shown that to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the linearity of preferences in the probabilities can be replaced by the weaker requirement of quasiconvexity in the probabilities.

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Chen, HC., Neilson, W.S. Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players. Theory and Decision 46, 201–212 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005099306184

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005099306184

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