The empirical foundation and justification of knowledge

Abstract

Whether empirical givenness has the reliability that foundationalists expect is a point about which some philosophers are highly skeptical. Sellars took the doctrine of givenness as a “myth,” denying the existence of immediate perceptual experience. The arguments in contemporary Western epistemology are concentrated on whether sensory experience has conceptual contents, and whether there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. In fact, once the elements of words and conceptions in empirical perception are affirmed, the logical relationship between perceptual experience and empirical belief is also affirmed. This relationship takes place through perceptual experience acting as evidence for beliefs. The real problem lies in how one should distinguish between the different relationships with perception of singular beliefs and of universal beliefs, and in how singular beliefs can provide justification for universal beliefs.

摘要

经验 “所与” 是否具有基础主义者所期待的可靠性, 受到一些哲学家的强烈质疑。 塞拉斯将所与论斥为一种 “神话”, 否定存在所谓直接的、 独立的知觉经验。 当前西方知识论这方面的论争, 集中在感性经验的状态是否具有概念的内容, 以及感觉与信念之间是否具有逻辑的关系这两个问题上。 实际上, 一旦肯定了知觉经验中的语词与概念因素, 也就肯定了知觉经验与经验信念之间的逻辑联系。 这种联系是通过知觉经验作为证据而发生的。 真正的问题在于应该区分开个别性信念与普遍性信念同知觉联系的不同情况, 以及个别性的信念如何为普遍性的信念提供确证。